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Two parties voluntarily enter into a long-term agreement
for the sale of goods.1 Each party presumes the agreement
serves its particular interests. Subsequently, an event occurs
that is not expressly provided for in the agreement, rendering
the agreement far more beneficial to one party and far less ben-
eficial to the other than either anticipated.2 The disadvantaged
party seeks to avoid performance by invoking any of the several
contract law doctrines that address this situation: frustration of
purpose, mistake, impossibility, or impracticability.3 What
ought to be done?
Common law courts traditionally construed these doctrines
narrowly, so the disadvantaged party's request for relief usually
failed.4 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), however, pur-
ports to set forth circumstances under which a disruptive event
such as the one described above would excuse the disadvan-
taged party. In section 2-615, the UCC conditions excuse on the
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This Article
benefitted from faculty workshops at the University of Michigan Law School,
Boston University School of Law, and Cardozo School of Law. Special thanks
are due to Ronald Cass, James Krier, Richard Lempert, Mark Pettit, David
Phillips, Glen Robinson, and Alan Schwartz.
1. The definition of a "long-term contract" will vary according to the
context of the transaction; for purposes of this Article, a long-term contract is
one in which a commercial seller agrees to supply goods to a commercial buyer
over a substantial period of time.
2. It is possible, of course, that only one of the parties will be surprised
by the intervening event. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40.
3. Technical differences exist between these doctrines. See Transatlantic
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966). These differ-
ences are not relevant to the present discussion. The Uniform Commercial
Code adopts the more flexible commercial impracticability standard. See
U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 3; infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. Unless
otherwise noted, all U.C.C. citations in this Article are to the 1978 official text.
4. The de rigueur citation here is Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897
(KB. 1647). See also A. CoRBiN, CONTRAC'rS § 1320 (1975); E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 9.5 (1982).
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parties' failure to allocate the risk that the disruptive event
might materialize,5 their assumption that the event would not
occur,6 and the impracticability of performance after materiali-
zation of the event.7 The accepted wisdom of students of the
UCC is that section 2-615 was intended to provide the courts
more flexibility to excuse performance.8 Numerous commenta-
tors have welcomed this development, arguing that the circum-
stances considered by the UCC mandate appropriate relief for
the party aggrieved by the "unforeseen" or "unanticipated"
event. 9
Beyond this, several commentators have urged greater lib-
eralization of remedies in case of such an event. Rather than
simply allowing avoidance of performance, some have proposed
a more flexible right to withhold performance pending modifi-
cation of the original contract to reflect a sharing of the bene-
fits and burdens generated by the disruptive event.'0 Although
the arguments for excuse and modification may differ, the
thrust of each claim is the same: the law ought to require the
advantaged party to adjust the original agreement.
Courts, however, have demonstrated singular resistance to
5. The risk need not be expressly allocated; the U.C.C. recognizes that
allocations of risk may be "found not only in the expressed terms of the con-
tract but in the circumstances surrounding the contracting, in trade usage and
the like." U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 8.
6. The nonoccurrence must be a "basic assumption on which the contract
was made." U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
7. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a); Note, U.C.C. Section 2-615: Excusing the Imprac-
ticable, 60 B.U.L. REV. 575, 577-78 (1980).
8. See U.C.C. § 2-615 comments 3, 4; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-9, at 128 (2d ed. 1980); 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW RE.
VISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 352 (1955).
9. See Duesenberg, "Impossibility": It Isn't Good Code Language, 1 J.L.
& CoM. 29, 42-46 (1981); Tannenbaum, Commercial Impracticability Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Natural Gas Distributors' Vehicle for Excusing
Long-Term Requirements Contracts?, 20 Hous. L. REV. 771, 776-99 (1983);
Comment, Loss Splitting in Contract Litigation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 153-54
(1950); Comment, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Con-
tract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE L.J. 1054, 1074 (1960).
10. See Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573 (1983);
Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Con-
tracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 369 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Speidel, Supply Con-
tracts]; Note, supra note 7, at 596-99; Comment, Equitable Reformation of
Long-Term Contracts-The "New Spirit" of ALCOA. 1982 UTAH L. REV. 985.
Judicial support for this position is typically sought in the case of Aluminum
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), the sin-
gle, and singular, case in which the court used § 2-615 to impose such a rem-
edy. See Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra; see also Speidel, The New Spirit of
Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193 (1982).
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the arguments for adjustment. The case law under section 2-
615 demonstrates that courts have, with rare exceptions," re-
jected claims for adjustment of contractual terms because of in-
tervening events.32 Instead, they have resolved the ambiguity
inherent in phrases such as "impracticable," "foreseeable," or
"basic assumption" against the parties seeking adjustment.
Certainly this has been the case when the parties are commer-
cial actors rather than consumers and when there is no hint
that overreaching by the advantaged party infected the original
bargaining process.
I suggest in this Article an explanation, and in large part a
justification, for the courts' reluctance to embrace the theories
of adjustment. My argument reflects a substantial doubt, which
I believe is shared by the decisions, that the imposition of a
duty to adjust mirrors commercial reality, social utility, or indi-
vidual right. I recognize, as do advocates of a duty to adjust,
that contractual expression is necessarily fragmentary due to
the incapacity of commercial actors to foretell completely
events that might disrupt original expectations.' 3 My disagree-
ment with adjustment advocates lies in the conclusions that fol-
11. See, eg., Asphalt Int'l, Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp., 667 F.2d 261
(2d Cir. 1981) (owner of tanker not obligated to repair vessel when cost of re-
pair prohibitive); Waldinger v. Ashbrook-Simon-Hartley, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 970
(C.D. Ill. 1983) (where engineer's specifications made supplier's product re-
strictive and noncompetitive, defendant was excused from performance); Sun-
flower Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 131, 638 P.2d 963
(1981) (where agreement to sell natural gas was expressly limited to that of a
certain well and that well was shown to be exhausted, sale of gas under the
contract was excused); Campbell v. Hottstetter Farms, Inc., 251 Pa. Super. 232,
380 A.2d 463 (1977) (delivery of grain excused where contract was for farmer's
estimated capacity and weather made crop fall short); Process Supply Co. v.
Sunstar Foods, 38 U.S.D.A. 747 (U.S. Dept. Agric. 1979) (compliance with an
order of state police regarding severe weather conditions excused delay in
delivery).
12. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 328-30
(10th Cir. 1982); Fratelli Gardino, S.p.A. v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 587 F.2d
204, 206 (5th Cir. 1979); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum In-
dus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1323-26 (E.D. La. 1981); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 437-42 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Publicker Indus., Inc. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989, 992-93 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 131,
138-39, 638 P.2d 963, 969-70 (1981); Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co., 256 Or. 539,
542, 474 P.2d 529, 530 (1970); Robberson Steel, Inc. v. J.D. Abrams, Inc., 582
S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
13. This view is implicit in all the literature of adjustment. It is explicit
in Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S.C.L. REv. 691, 726-27 (1974),




low from this premise. From my perspective, the adjustment
arguments assume a view of rational commercial behavior that
understates the ability of commercial actors to engage in con-
duct for which they can be considered, from an ethical or be-
havioral perspective, responsible. I argue that even if
commercial actors cannot foretell the occurrence of events,
they can plan rationally with the inevitable uncertainty of the
future in mind to estimate and control the consequences of
those events. If a commercial actor is able to bargain with un-
certainty in mind, I suggest the law ought to consider a such
bargain the product of a cognitive and analytical process for
which the actor can be held accountable, notwithstanding the
intervention of specific events that the actor did not predict.
The failure of the law to respect decisions made under these
circumstances is unjustifiably paternalistic towards individual
actors and frustrates individual effort that would otherwise
generate greater personal and social welfare. I therefore reject
recent commentary that views contract necessarily as a commu-
nitarian exercise and instead adopt a conception of contract as a
mechanism for individual expression by commercial actors ca-
pable of considering and bearing the consequences of reasoned
choice.
In Part I, this Article proposes a model of decision making
that suggests commercial actors are able to bargain rationally
concerning "unforeseen" events. The model, therefore, mili-
tates against any duty to adjust based on the incapacity of the
parties to foretell the future. Part II examines the arguments
for a duty to adjust and elaborates the nonadjustment model in
light of these arguments, concluding that the principles of rela-
tionalism and desert on which advocates of adjustment rely
cannot adequately support the imposition of a duty to adjust.
Finally, Part III discusses the absoluteness of the nonadjust-
ment model to determine whether the imposition of a duty to
adjust might be appropriate in certain situations.
I. THE NONADJUSTMENT MODEL
A. SOME PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES: "RATIONALITY" AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF A RULE
1. Rationality
The first preliminary inquiry that must be made before in-
vestigating the propriety of a duty to adjust is the nature of ra-
tionality. Central to this Article is the concept that actors are
[Vol. 69:521
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capable of reaching a rational decision or engaging in a rational
bargaining process. Rationality obviously does not equal op-
timality of result, because decision making in ignorance of the
future will lead to suboptimal results in some, indeed many,
cases.' 4 For purposes of this Article, a "rational" decision or
bargaining process is one in which the decision maker deter-
mines a course of action only after obtaining a minimum level
of information concerning possible acts and consequences and
having adequate time to consider their desirability.'5 It is diffi-
cult, especially prior to laying out the argument, to define with
precision both the minimum level of information and the requi-
site time for detached reflection that would qualify as "ra-
tional."16 Obviously, a rational decision reached today
concerning next year's oil prices will be based on different and
less complete information than a rational decision concerning
tomorrow's oil prices. Similarly, if no decision that is made
without time to discover all relevant information can be recog-
nized as rational, any guess, whether informed, probabilistic, or
otherwise, is doomed to the realm of the irrational. Thus, as ra-
tionality can only be determined in context, for now it is per-
haps best understood by its consequences: a rational decision is
a decision that a court should not override on the basis that the
decision maker was deprived of the ability to make a meaning-
ful choice.
2. Significance of a Rule
The second preliminary inquiry is whether the imposition
of an obligation to adjust makes a difference in the ultimate
bargain reached by the parties. General principles of commer-
14. If commercial actors "rationally" plan for a contingency, they will dis-
count the effects of the contingency by the probability of its occurrence. The
value of the actual state of affairs, however, will always diverge from the value
of that "rationally" expected state of affairs. Because the contingencies either
will or will not arise, an actor with perfect information would have assigned a
probability of 1.0 or 0 to the contingency rather than discounting it by some-
thing in between. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. REv. 1089, 1099-1100 (1981).
15. The possibility that the decision maker can engage in deliberation is
the focus of the definition. See R. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION I (2d ed.
1983).
16. The allusion here is to Justice Holmes's implication that legal rules
may depend on the ability of actors to consider the consequences of their ac-
tions. Reasonable conduct thus may vary with the circumstances: "Detached
reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." Brown v.
United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
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cial law permit parties to bargain for any clause they wish,7
and UCC section 2-615 permits parties to allocate losses as they
desire with respect to unforeseen events.' 8 Assuming that the
actors are commercial parties of relatively equal bargaining
power, they will presumably allocate risks to minimize the ex-
pected loss from such risks. If an existing rule of law does not
reflect that allocation, the parties will voluntarily contract out
of that rule.'9 Under these circumstances, the favored rule of
law is the one that the parties would reach in most transactions
through independent bargaining. The law then minimizes
transaction costs by making such bargaining unnecessary in a
majority of cases.20 Thus, some may argue that the substantive
rule of law is irrelevant except insofar as it coincides with or
diverges from the rule dictated by efficient exchange.
Even if one accepts this transaction-cost model for contract
law generally, however, it does not necessarily follow that the
substantive rule of law is irrelevant in adjustment cases. Some
rule of law is necessary to fill the gap when parties have not
expressly allocated a risk. The transaction-cost model assumes
that the gap is best filled by a rule reflecting what parties
would choose in most cases if left to their own devices. As indi-
cated below,21 however, no such majority or strong plurality
rule exists with respect to disruptive events. Instead, there are
a wide variety of risk-allocation devices, none of which appears
to dominate or can be fairly said to represent what parties
would have chosen in most cases. Instead, allocations appear to
be specific to particular industries or particular bargains.22
Consequently, no rule is necessarily advantageous in reducing
transaction costs, and the gap-filling rule must serve some soci-
etal objective other than the elusive goal of efficient
exchange.23
17. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
18. See U.C.C. § 2-615.
19. See Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 150 (1977).
20. A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 20 (1982); Joskow, supra note 19, at 150; Kronman, Paternalism
and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1983).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 142-54.
22. See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129,
134 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (parties to uranium supply contract had allocated the
risk of unforeseeable price fluctuations), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441-42 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (volatility of oil market and
threat of oil embargo was foreseen and bargained for).
23. See Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271,
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Moreover, the failure of most parties to bargain out of the
existing rule allocating risks, UCC section 2-615, does not neces-
sarily imply that the allocation dictated by that section provides
the optimal result. Even assuming that parties understand that
section 2-615 will govern if the contract is silent on the issue of
impracticability,24 acceptance of section 2-615, either explicitly
or by silence, does not mean the parties would have bargained
to such a provision had section 2-615 not existed. If they were
writing on a clean slate, the parties might have chosen some al-
ternative risk allocation provision. In the absence of the "pre-
sumptive" allocation of the UCC, a party may consider excuse,
or excuse under the circumstances provided by section 2-615, to
be a second-best solution. Given the existence of section 2-615,
however, the cost of bargaining to that allocation is minimal; all
one need do is remain silent. The additional cost of bargaining
to the first-best solution may exceed the expected marginal
gain from that solution. In effect, therefore, the existence of a
state-imposed, presumptive gap filler that permits excuse may
predetermine what allocation will be chosen by the parties.
B. THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
1. Minimal Externalities
The nonadjustment model rests on three assumptions, the
latter two of which are noncontroversial in the context of cur-
rent commercial practice. The model first assumes that the
contract does not impose significant costs on nonparties, that is,
that there are minimal externalities. Because long-term con-
tracts can result in substantial external effects, this assumption
must eventually be relaxed.25 Beginning the analysis with the
assumption, however, permits focusing on the assertion under-
lying the argument for adjustment, that the parties suffer from
283-84 (1979). Professor Alan Schwartz suggests that there may evolve certain
recurring situations in which a specific optimal adjustment rule dominates. In
such a case, a court may, with some confidence, apply that adjustment rule
where the recurring fact pattern exists and the parties have been silent. See
Ehrlich & Posner, Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 266 (1974). The proper analogy seems to be the derivation of a standard of
reasonable care from a custom that evolves from a bargain. See R. POSNER,
EcoNoMIc ANALYSIs OF LAw 125-26 (2d ed. 1977).
24. For an interesting account of the familiarity of business administra-
tors of long-term supply contracts with legal principles that underlie their ob-
ligations when disruptive events occur, see White, Contract Law in Modern
Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life,
22 WAsHBURN L.J. 1, 14-18 (1982).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 207-15.
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limited rationality.26 The duty to adjust is rarely defended on
the grounds that changed circumstances adversely affect non-
parties;27 the argument is instead that adjustment is necessary
to vindicate the interests of the parties themselves. The as-
sumption of minimal externalities thus is appropriate, at least
for a statement of the outer boundaries of the nonadjustment
model.
2. Self-Interested Actors
The model also assumes that commercial parties are self-
interested, that is, that each party values what it receives in the
exchange more than what it surrenders.28 In the case of a long-
term agreement, each party believes that such an arrangement
will produce more beneficial results-a steady source of goods
for the buyer and a regular market for the seller, at predictable
prices-than the alternative of entering the market to purchase
or sell on a regular basis over the term of the contract.29 Each
26. See infra text accompanying notes 68-83.
27. See Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frus-
trating Things-The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L.
REV. 419, 445 (1969), for a rare, albeit brief, statement of concern for the exter-
nal effects of disruptive events.
28. Use of the neuter "it" recognizes that the commercial actors with
which this Article is concerned are typically firms rather than individuals.
This fact makes speaking in terms of the rationality of the actor awkward, be-
cause decisions typically emerge after input from a variety of individuals who
act on behalf of the firm. The decision of the actor, therefore, may be a com-
promise of a disputed decision within the firm itself. Moreover, the decision
may be skewed from what the firm, acting in the interest of its owners, would
consider rational, because the persons acting on behalf of the firm make
choices out of self-interest rather than out of the interests of the owners. Nev-
ertheless, those decisions are treated as rational decisions for the firm since
the reduction of divergence between managerial self-interest and interest of
the firm lies within the realm of corporate law and intracorporate contracts
and does not require other parties to monitor the firm's intracorporate struc-
ture. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
29. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 432
(S.D. Fla. 1975). In a recent draft of a paper on long-term contracts, Professor
Victor Goldberg suggests that parties enter such contracts to achieve the bene-
fits of cooperation rather than to avoid risks of future price changes. See
Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts (forthcoming) (copy on
file with the author). No single explanation, however, seems to cover all cases.
A party may enter the contract to avoid risks, to obtain the benefits of cooper-
ation, or to gamble on a belief about future price changes. Indeed, the variety
of possible explanations supports the argument that parties should be permit-
ted to strike a bargain that reflects their motivations for entering into the con-
tract, free from concern that courts may subsequently require adjustment.
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party may avoid market fluctuations during the contract's term
and the costs of negotiating serial contracts at spot prices. In
addition, participation in long-term arrangements may facilitate
a party's ability to obtain loans or otherwise alter its capital
structure by demonstrating long-term viability.30 Although
some commentators question the desirability of a norm of self-
interest in commercial pursuits,3 ' this assumption seems justi-
fied in light of current practice.32
3. Three Conditions of Decision Making
Finally, the model assumes that in negotiating the terms of
a contract, each actor is faced with a "decision problem,"33 that
is, the actor must choose one clause among several possibilities
to form each term of the contract. At the negotiation stage, an
actor will have varying degrees of knowledge about the subse-
quent consequences of choosing a specific term. The actor may
believe it has full and accurate knowledge of the consequences
of some clauses,34 so that a choice of whether to bargain for one
of them is made under a condition of certainty. Alternatively,
the actor may have knowledge of a range of consequences that
may follow from a specific choice and be able to assign a
probability to each potential consequence, so the actor can
make its choice under a condition of risk. Finally, the actor
may recognize that the limited mental capacity of the human
organism3 5 renders it unable to consider all potential conse-
30. See, eg., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129.
137 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
31. See, e.g., Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L
REv. 829 (1983); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
32. Even those who question the validity of the economists' assumption
that rational persons are necessarily self-interested suggest that the assump-
tion holds true in matters of trade and commerce. See Sen, Rational Fools- A
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 317, 318 (1977).
33. See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMEs AND DECISIONS 276 (1957).
34. Whether the probabilities that the actor assigns have any factual or
evidentiary basis is irrelevant. What is important is that the actor uses some
probabilistic analysis, however subjective, to make its choice. See M. BACH-
ARACH, ECONOAUCS AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 14 (1977). Thus, an actor's
knowledge of an event in the context of this Article is what an actor believes
it knows rather than objective knowledge or an actual state of affairs. This
may lead to egregious cases of bizarre behavior being deemed rational. See
Berlin, Rationality of Value Judgments, in NOMOS VII: RATIONAL DECISION
(C. Friedrich ed. 1964). This claim is made only for the commercial context.
35. Professor E. Allen Farnsworth invoked the psychological concept of
1985]
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quences or to apply probabilities to those that are identified.
For example, a commercial actor may know that the materiali-
zation of a certain event, such as an oil embargo, would be cata-
strophic for the contract but be unable to predict the event's
probability. Alternatively, the actor may believe that there is a
0.1 probability of such an event during the contract term but be
unsure of the loss that would result. Finally, the actor may
identify an oil embargo as a potentially disruptive event but be
unable to assign either a probability or a value to its occur-
rence. In each of these cases, the actor must decide how to
draft the contract under a condition of uncertainty.36
No sharp dividing lines separate the risk, certainty, and un-
certainty conditions. For example, both risk and certainty al-
low a decision maker to assign definite probabilities, ranging
from zero to one hundred percent, to a specific consequence.
Although action under a condition of risk requires the decision
maker to guess about the future, the assignment of a
probability allows for an educated guess, based on an event's
expected value and discounted by the decision maker's risk
aversion or risk preference, that approximates conditions of
certainty.37 Thus, the actor operating under a condition of risk
has as much information relevant to its decision as an actor
under a condition of certainty. An extension of this reasoning
could create only the two categories of uncertainty and cer-
tainty and subsume risk in the latter.
"limited attention" to suggest that commercial actors will not consider all pos-
sible consequences of their conduct, not even all foreseeable consequences. In-
stead, actors will select a few "significant situations" and create expectations
about the entire scope of possible consequences from those examples. See
Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 868-70. For Farnsworth, this selection process,
in which omissions from the contract are inevitable, broadens the realm of un-
consented-to risks and therefore increases the area in which courts may inter-
vene with "principles of fairness or justice" to adjust the relationship between
parties. Id. at 891; see infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
36. Important works on decisions made under various conditions of the
knowledge of consequences include R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 33, at 13,
and F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). See inkfra text accom-
panying notes 176-77; see also M. BACHARACH, supra note 34, at 14-15; J.
MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 136 (1958); Lipton, Contract and Uncer-
tainty: The Reformation of an International Business Agreement, 1 CARDOZO
L. REV. 449 (1979).
37. For instance, a risk-neutral decision maker who knows that a course
of action has a 50% chance of producing a $100 return is in as good a position
to determine whether to take that course of action as a decision maker who Is
100% certain that the course of action would produce a $100 return. Of course,




Alternatively, one could equate risk with uncertainty be-
cause both require dealing with unknowns and thus require
guessing about the consequences of present action. In addition,
some commentators suggest that actors who pursue a course of
conduct with uncertain consequences have implicitly assigned a
probability to each potential consequence. The actors' revealed
preferences thus transform the situation into one of risk.38
This reasoning could also create only the two categories of un-
certainty and certainty but subsume risk in the former.
For present purposes, however, it is helpful to retain cer-
tainty, risk, and uncertainty as separate categories. The condi-
tions of ignorance that describe uncertainty are similar to those
that adjustment advocates use to define whether an event is
sufficiently unforeseeable to warrant excuse from performance.
The limits placed on adjustment by those commentators, how-
ever, recognize that some risks are not subject to judicial re-
allocation. If examination of these separate categories suggests
that the dividing line between risk and uncertainty is less
meaningful than the adjustment arguments assume, then sepa-
rate legal treatment of decisions made under these conditions
may be unwarranted.
C. NEGOTIATING UNDER RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
As a decision maker attempts to increase its knowledge
and move from a condition of uncertainty to a condition of risk
or certainty, the costs of decision making increase. As the deci-
sion maker gains experience, it needs to expend less effort to
reduce uncertainty or to make assessments of risk that it be-
lieves reflect actual probabilities and values.39 To the extent
that risk or uncertainty remains, however, such a condition im-
poses significant costs on the contracting process. Each actor
will be unsure whether future events may lead it to regret hav-
ing tied itself to a specific price term from a specific source of
38. For instance, one author suggests that an insurer who charges a $2,500
premium to insure against a $1,000,000 reward for the capture of the Loch
Ness monster may be inferred to believe that there is less than a .0025
probability that the monster will be caught. See Lopes, Some Thoughts on the
Psychological Concept of Risk, 9 J. EXPERm-ENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUuAN PER-
CEPTION & PERFORMANCE 137, 138-43 (1983). For a review of the literature, see
id.; Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643
(1961).
39. At the same time, on the assumption that easily uncovered data will
be discovered first, the further an actor moves along the spectrum from uncer-




supply or a specific market. At the negotiation stage, therefore,
each party will want to minimize risks that it can identify and
allocate the costs of unidentifiable risks to minimize its expo-
sure.40 Generally, the degree of uncertainty, and thus the cost
associated with avoiding subsequent regret, increases with the
length of the contract term, because longer periods provide
more opportunity for unexpected events.
With respect to disruptive events that are expressly identi-
fied, the parties may negotiate over who ought to bear the risk
and what price the other party ought to pay in exchange. For
an identified, negotiated risk, no reason exists for the law to
impose a subsequent adjustment should the risk actually mate-
rialize. The party to whom the recognized risk was allocated by
negotiation presumably believed itself in a superior position to
avoid the risk or to insure against its materialization. That
party either obtained or had the opportunity to obtain compen-
sation for taking the risk through ex ante adjustment of the
contract price.41 When the risk materializes, therefore, even
those who advocate adjustment in other circumstances reject
pleas for court-imposed modification.42
40. Minimizing exposure does not necessarily mean allocating the risk to
the other party. An actor who is in a superior position to bear a risk would
presumably prefer to be paid to bear it rather than to pay the other party the
greater sum necessary to induce that party to bear the risk.
41. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 93-95 (1982); Goetz &
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE
L.J. 1261, 1285 (1980). Whether ex ante compensation constitutes consent to
an activity has been the subject of some debate. See Coleman, Efficiency, Util-
ity, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 509, 534-39 (1980); Dwor-
kin, Why Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 574-79 (1980); Posner, The
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudica-
tion, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491-97 (1980). That debate has centered on the
question of whether the ex ante receipt of compensation for taking a risk con-
stitutes consent to the materialization of that risk. The claim here is weaker;
it is that the receipt of ex ante compensation for taking a risk precludes the
recipient from complaining against the party who paid the compensation
should the risk materialize. The difference in the two positions is evident
from elaboration of an example given by Professor Jules Coleman. Coleman
asserts that if a potential home buyer purchases a home in a high-crime dis-
trict for a low price rather than a home in a low-crime district for a high price
(and assuming that price is correlated with crime level), it would be implausi-
ble to contend that the buyer had consented to being burglarized. Coleman,
supra, at 536-37, n.45. Although that may be true, the weaker position would
plausibly contend that the buyer, having bargained for the risk, would have no
complaint against the seller with whom the buyer bargained if a burglary
occurred.
42. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 617, 620 (1983); Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra note 10, at
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1. The Argument for Adjustment
The argument for adjustment, therefore, concerns those
events that have not been the subject of negotiation. In this
context, the argument for adjustment has, at first glance, sub-
stantial appeal. For those who favor adjustment, the alloca-
tional bargain that creates responsibility also limits it; because
contractual liability is predicated on consent to take certain
risks, unanticipated risks not the subject of bargaining fall
outside the area of consent.43 Thus, no obligation to accept
those risks flows from the promises that the parties have made
to one another. When the unforeseen risk materializes, the
world has changed from the one anticipated by the parties dur-
ing negotiation. The resulting loss must be borne by someone;
the deal originally contemplated has gone awry. Since it would
be unfair to visit the unforeseen adverse consequences on a sin-
gle party who did not consent to take the risk, either the con-
tract should be dissolved or some compromise or adjustment
should be imposed. The principles that may guide adjustment
vary. For some commentators, the contract should be adjusted
according to principles derived from deontological concepts of
what the advantaged and the disadvantaged parties "deserve."44
For others, the principles of adjustment may be inferred from
analysis of the relationship the parties created when they en-
tered the contract.45 In any case, because the parties never
reached any ex ante bargain with respect to this particular risk,
failure to impose damages for nonperformance or to order spe-
cific performance does no disservice to contractual integrity.
The intervening event simply brings about a state of affairs dif-
ferent from the one with respect to which the contract was
made.
There are, of course, limits to the circumstances that trig-
ger the duty to adjust; no commentator advocates adjustment
405-06 (adjustment limited to situations when there is a "gap" in the bargain)
(courts enforce express risk allocations).
Excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615 is also limited to risks for which a party has
not "assumed a greater obligation." Alternatively, identification of and negoti-
ation concerning a risk indicates that the intervening act is not one "the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made."
U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
43. Justice Holmes captured this notion in his argument against liability
for non-negligent accidents that cause unanticipated injuries: "A choice which
entails a concealed consequence is as to that consequence no choice." O.W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
44. See infra notes 178-206 and accompanying text.
45. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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whenever circumstances change. A separation of situations in
which commercial actors can rationally take risks from those in
which they cannot underlies all adjustment arguments. Advo-
cates of adjustment implicitly suggest that binding a party to a
risk is appropriate only if some minimal level of information
concerning that risk is available to the parties at the negotia-
tion stage. Below that minimum, usually defined by reference
to what is anticipated or foreseeable, actors are deemed to have
speculated about the future under conditions so uncertain that
they render the subsequent allocation unfair or undesirable.
2. Contractual Silence as Allocation of Risk
Although the adjustment argument is appealing, closer ex-
amination indicates that it suffers from serious shortcomings.
Given that the parties ought to be held to their bargains with
respect to expressly allocated risks,46 it does not follow that a
contract's failure to include a clause expressly addressing an
event that subsequently occurs means that that risk was not
identified or allocated. Risks may be allocated by an implicit
process, inferred from circumstances and usage of trade.47 Ad-
vocates of adjustment would agree that risks may be implicitly
allocated48 and would likely extend their view of "voluntary ex-
change" to such allocations. Even where no trade usage domi-
nates, however, the parties' silence about the risk that
ultimately materializes requires that an allocation of risk be
imputed. For instance, the absence of an explicit allocation or
allocation through trade usage may imply an intent of the par-
ties that the disadvantaged party be excused from all perform-
ance under the contract on the occurrence of a section 2-615
event.49 Thus, the promisee, who would then receive no benefit
46. See U.C.C. § 2-615.
47. See § 2-615 comment 8; see also Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster
Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) (custom of adjustment in trade); Robberson
Steel, Inc. v. J.D. Abrams, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (fore-
seeable risk implicitly allocated through custom).
48. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 10, at 988-89.
49. The drafters provided that an excused seller must fulfill its contract to
the extent that the supervening contingency permits. See U.C.C. § 2-615 com-
ment 11. That may require partial performance in some cases, for example,
where the supervening event is the closing of the sole source of the goods after
the seller has obtained part of the buyer's order. See U.C.C. § 2-615(b). But
where the supervening event applies to all goods, as in the case of crop failure,
war, or embargo, performance is likely to be totally excused, if it is excused at
all. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) & comment 4 ("Delay in delivery or non-delivery in
whole or in part") (emphasis added).
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from the bargain, implicitly bears the risk of the intervening
event.5 0 Labelling a risk as "unforeseeable" or "unanticipated,"
therefore, does not compel a conclusion that the parties did not
allocate the risk; rather, it indicates how the risk was allocated.
Viewing the allocational bargain as an attempt by parties to
reduce the existence and consequences of risk and uncer-
tainty,5 1 it follows that the parties will sometimes attempt to
attain that result by implicit allocations or by acceptance of
state-imposed allocations. The self-interested actor will use the
allocation technique that permits optimum avoidance of the net
costs associated with risk and uncertainty, not necessarily maxi-
mum avoidance of risk or uncertainty itself. The actor will
seek to eliminate only that degree of unpredictability that can
be reduced at a cost perceived to be less than the expected
cost5 2 of the risk itself; to invest more would be contrary to the
assumption of self-interest.
The cost of reducing risk and uncertainty is a function of
the cost of identifying potentially disruptive events and the cost
of either ex ante negotiation about risk allocation or ex post ne-
gotiation and litigation about contract modification. Ex ante
identification of risks requires the actor to expend resources to
determine historical patterns of how similar contracts have
been derailed and to predict future disruptions. Similarly, ne-
gotiation concerning identified risks requires investment of re-
sources to determine which party is in a superior position to
assume the risk and what concessions will be made to induce
that party to take advantage of its position.53 In addition, a con-
tractual provision concerning the risk may be the subject of an
enforcement action if the risk materializes and the party to
whom the risk is allocated fails to perform. The enforcement
action obviously will also impose costs on the actors. At some
point, therefore, the anticipated costs of identifying risks, nego-
tiating with respect to them, and enforcing the negotiated con-
50. See C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMiISE 64-65 (1981).
51. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
52. The expected loss or expected cost would be a function of the actual
loss or cost borne by the actor should the risk materialize discounted by the
probability that it will materialize. In any case, the determination to bargain
explicitly about risks will also depend on the actor's level of risk preference.
53. See, eg., Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Con tracdx Some
Thoughts about Risk Management 32 S.C.L. REv. 241, 251-54 (1980) (enumer-
ating factors relevant to determining which party is the superior bearer of a
particular risk, e.g., knowledge and experience in the area the contract con-




tractual provision may exceed either the expected loss of a
risk's materialization or the expected cost of negotiating a mod-
ification or allowing a court to allocate the risk after the disrup-
tive event occurs. If that point is reached, even a commercial
actor with perfect information would not seek to include a con-
tract provision concerning that particular risk.54
This nonadjustment model suggests that commercial actors
may exclude a risk from their completed contract not because
the risk was beyond their contemplation but because they con-
sidered it and decided that inclusion was not worth the com-
mensurate cost.55 In short, exclusion of a certain risk may be a
54. Farnsworth thus concludes that the written contract agreed to by the
parties must survive two selection processes: first, the process in which parties
identify the events that the contract will cover; second, the process in which
the parties decide which of the identified events are suitable for inclusion in
the contract. See Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 868-71.
Professor Steven Shavell makes the point with respect to the issue of us-
ing damage measures as a substitute for complete contracts:
Suppose that t1 is the cost of including in the contract a Pareto effi-
cient provision for a contingency that will occur with probability p,
that e is the cost of enforcing the provision if the contingency occurs,
that t2 > e is the cost of dispute resolution if there is no contract pro-
vision for the contingency and it occurs, and that b is the cost attribu-
table to deviation from Pareto efficiency under the system for dispute
resolution. Then there will be no provision for the contingency in-
cluded in the contract if the expected cost of making a provision,
tj + pe, exceeds the expected costs of not doing so, p(t 2 + b), or,
equivalently, if t1 > p(t 2 + b - e). Hence, a low probability of oc-
currence... militates against including a provision for the contin-
gency in the contract.
Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 468
n.7 (1980) (emphasis in original).
55. Professor Farnsworth refers to this phenomenon as "understatement
of expression," which may be generated by fear of delaying or losing the deal
over issues of language rather than by inattention to the risk. See Farnsworth,
supra note 13, at 886. One of the clearest cases of this phenomenon occurred
during negotiations for a contract that resulted in litigation after the closing of
the Suez Canal in 1956. Lord Denning's recitation of the facts is worth quoting
at length:
It was obvious to all mercantile men that English and French forces
might be sent to seize the canal, and that this might lead to it becom-
ing impassable to traffic. It was in this atmosphere that negotiations
took place for the chartering of the vessel Eugenia. She flew the Li-
berian flag. The proposal was to charter her to a Russian state trad-
ing corporation called V/O Sovfracht. The Russians wanted her to
carry iron and steel from the Black Sea to India. The negotiations
took place in London between the agents of the parties from August
29 to September 9, 1956. The agents of both sides realised that there
was a risk that the Suez Canal might be closed, and each agent sug-
gested terms to meet the possibility. But they came to no agreement.
And in the end they concluded the bargain on the terms of the Bal-
time Charter without any express clause to deal with the matter.
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voluntary choice by a rational actor. Consequently, if one of
the excluded contingencies arises, the party on whom the loss
initially falls cannot complain, provided its estimates of the
probability of occurrence and the cost of dispute resolution are
accurate. Similarly, if it underestimated the probability of the
occurrence or the cost of dispute resolution, its ex ante calcula-
tions were no less purposive and do not by themselves justify a
rule that requires sharing of the loss.56
Professor Richard E. Speidel also acknowledges that the
written agreement of the parties will be incomplete. To him,
these "failures of agreement in the process of voluntary ex-
change" are twofold: the failure to identify and allocate explic-
itly the risk of a change in circumstances and the failure to
reach an agreed modification to fill the gap, created by the first
failure, after the risk materializes.57 These seem equivalent to
the absence of identification and ex ante or ex post negotiation
about an identified risk discussed above. For Professor Speidel,
however, the consequences of the absence of explicit risk allo-
cation when unidentified events are also "unanticipated" are
dramatically different. In his view, the failures represent true
gaps in the bargaining process that trigger judicial intervention,
either by imposing on the parties the bargain they likely would
have arrived at had they expressly considered and allocated the
loss or, in Professor Speidel's more dramatic suggestion, by im-
posing a compromise price adjustment on the parties in some
That meant that, if the canal were to be closed, they would "leave it
to the lawyers to sort out."
Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia), 2 Q.B. 226, 233-
34 (1964). The parties may also have intended implicitly to allocate risks by
providing for a specific type of charter which, as a matter of custom, placed
risk on one party rather than another. See generally Schlegel, supra note 27,
at 436 (explaining difference between time charterparty and voyage charter-
party in allocating losses due to frustration).
56. Indeed, an argument from autonomy could contend that state interfer-
ence with mistaken judgment prevents the development of "moral muscle,"
which requires the unencumbered exercise of personal judgment, notwith-
standing that individuals may come to regret their decisions. See Feinberg,
Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution?, 58 NO.
TRE DAME LAW. 445, 457-58 & n.16 (1983). The "moral muscle" argument as-
sumes that there will be subsequent opportunities to apply what has been
learned from previous mistakes. Thus, it is more difficult to apply this partic-
ular antipaternalism rationale to singular decisions or to decisions that are
likely to have consequences that impede future opportunities for decision
making, such as a decision to have a lobotomy. For the application of these
constraints to the long-term supply contract, see infra text accompanying
notes 68-87.




Viewed in this way, however, Speidel's inquiry may be off
to a false start. If the exchange is, as Speidel assumes, a volun-
tary one between rational actors, then any "failure" to include
specific terms or to consider a specific risk may itself be a vol-
untary part of the agreement. What the parties have agreed to,
in effect, is to consider only certain risks and no others. The
failure to allocate a risk in a voluntary bargain does not neces-
sarily constitute a failure of agreement or of the bargaining
process; it may constitute a decision by the party who will suf-
fer from the risk's materialization that the expected loss from
the risk is not worth the resources that would have to be in-
vested to identify it and allocate it expressly.
An example may help here. Assume that Paper Supplier
and Printer are negotiating a contract for all of Printer's paper
requirements over the next twenty years. Supplier will want to
consider a variety of risks that may materialize over the course
of the proposed contract term and include appropriate provi-
sions for some of them. Various events could affect the value
of the contract. Extended strikes at paper mills could reduce
the supply of paper and drive up costs. Advanced technology in
word processing could reduce errors in printed work and re-
duce Printer's demand for paper. An insect infestation could
destroy millions of acres of timberland. The states of Washing-
ton and Oregon could secede from the Union and place a lum-
ber embargo on shipments to the remaining states. Not all of
these risks will be provided for in the contract, even if Supplier
thinks of each of them. Supplier will discount the loss that it
would suffer if it were to bear a specific risk and the event
were to materialize by the probability that the event will occur.
It is unlikely further to analyze the risk, bargain about its
proper allocation, or draft a provision covering it if the costs of
that process exceed the expected loss from the risk. Thus, the
absence of the allocation in the contract does not necessarily in-
dicate a failure to agree in the sense that the parties were una-
ware of a risk or acted contrary to their desires. It may merely
describe a situation in which a party potentially harmed by a
subsequent event chose not to make the investment necessary
58. Speidel defines the "operative situation" in which court ordered ad-
justment is appropriate as arising "when unanticipated change causes substan-
tial unbargained for gains and losses in the performance of a long-term
contract for the supply or processing of goods." Id. at 395.
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to allocate the risk elsewhere.59
Still, Supplier's silence cannot be without consequences. If
the law excuses Supplier's performance when a disruptive
event materializes, it determines that silence about the issue
was intended to place on Printer the risk that the contract
would end under such circumstances. If the law adjusts the ob-
ligations of both parties, it reads the silence as showing that
neither intended fully to bear the loss in such a case. If the law
fails to adjust the contract in any manner, it interprets the si-
lence as the assumption of the risk by Supplier.
In choosing among these alternatives, little purpose is
served by saying that the parties failed to consider this risk if
what is meant is that the party on whom the loss initially falls
determined not to think about it. Indeed, Supplier's contrac-
tual silence may then require it to bear the loss. If, with more
effort, Supplier could have identified and bargained about the
risk but determined that additional effort would not be cost-ef-
fective, Supplier's subsequent assertion that it should be ex-
cused because its attention was not directed to the risk seems
hollow. Because risk bearing is costly, had the parties bar-
gained explicitly about the risk at Supplier's insistence and had
Printer accepted the risk, Printer would have received compen-
sation to reflect that risk bearing. Thus, any subsequent impo-
sition of that risk on Printer through a duty to adjust the
contract unjustly rewards Supplier and penalizes Printer.
Although it is theoretically conceivable that Supplier could
compensate Printer for the adjustment, it is unlikely that the
parties, assisted by the court, could replicate with hindsight the
bargain they would have struck at the negotiation stage.6o
Indeed, the inference from contractual silence that the par-
ties were ignorant of the disruptive event's possibility may dis-
serve the negotiation process, at least if that process is
predicated on pursuit of self-interest. For instance, Supplier
alone might fail to identify a risk, the materialization of which
would place it at a disadvantage. Printer may identify the risk
but consider that, from its perspective, materialization of the
event threatens no harm and could make the contract more
profitable. In addition, Printer may recognize that bringing the
59. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 41, at 1279-80.
60. Both courts and the parties will have difficulty with any attempt accu-
rately to reconstruct their ex ante preferences after a disruptive event has oc-
curred. This difficulty has led at least one author to disfavor loss splitting in
impossibility cases. See Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAI. L REV.
1, 8 n.20 (1976).
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risk to Supplier's attention will require additional negotiation
costs and require Printer to compensate Supplier if the latter is
to bear the risk. Absent any duty to disclose,61 Printer is un-
likely to bring the risk to Supplier's attention. As a result, the
risk will not be allocated expressly, even though one of the par-
ties has identified it and considers it an appropriate subject for
negotiation. In this situation, a gap exists in the contract just as
if neither party had identified the risk. Nevertheless, given the
general absence of a duty to disclose, only a will theory of con-
tract, requiring meeting of the minds on all contract terms,
would support the conclusion that the gap emanates from a
failure to reach agreement that warrants modification to save
Supplier from its own folly.
D. RATIONAL ACTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
1. "True Uncertainty"
At this point, adjustment advocates might object that the
analysis makes some assumptions that are unwarranted in the
case of true uncertainty, to which adjustment arguments are
primarily directed. The advocates would assert that the
nonadjustment model is an argument about rational actors who
have sufficient knowledge to seek optimal solutions.62 Such ac-
tors are capable of identifying goals and objectives, of recogniz-
ing alternative mechanisms for achieving those goals and
objectives, of projecting the various consequences that flow
from choosing a particular alternative, and of selecting the al-
ternative that produces the greatest net personal gain. Even an
61. As a general rule, there is no duty to disclose information in a com-
mercial bargain transaction. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 288
(2d ed. 1977). For a discussion of the proper scope of a duty to disclose, see
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEG. STUD. 1 (1978). But see Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App. 3d 918, 296
N.E.2d 871 (1973) (violation of good faith obligation not to disclose trade cus-
tom); cf. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.11, at 238-40 (1982) (erosion of gen-
eral rule). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts extends a duty to disclose
to situations in which disclosure would correct a mistake of the other party as
to a "basic assumption" on which that party relied in making the contract. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1981).
62. See, e.g., G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS 10-38 (1971) (giving a general overview of the features of a ra-
tional actor as that actor appears in academic political science literature, and
explaining the methodology by which a model of a rational actor is con-
structed); Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL.
ECON. 211, 211-12 (1950) (analogizing the economic system to biological evolu-
tion in order to explain how choices may be rational even under circumstances
in which foresight is not possible).
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actor with imperfect knowledge can rationally make choices
under the assigned probabilities associated with a situation of
risk. A party who is in an inferior position to prevent a loss or
to insure against it may bargain to shift that loss to the other
party who, recognizing its superior position, will gladly accept it
for a fee that precisely reflects its increased risk.0
Unfortunately, the adjustment advocates continue, the
world is not always so lovely. In the case of true uncertainty,
an actor may be unable to identify, quantify, and select among
risks not out of idiosyncratic ignorance but because the calcula-
tions necessary to the choice are beyond human capacity, the
evidence of the potential disruptive event has not been discov-
ered, or that evidence is prohibitively expensive to unearth.64
The seeds of Oregon's secession fifteen years hence may not yet
have been sown. How are rational actors to identify the risk?
What probability of materialization are they to assign to it?
Can any choice they make about the future be said to have
been made with this event in mind? Omissions from the writ-
ten contract that result from such uncertainty are not, accord-
ing to the objection, generated by the kinds of calculations or
problem-solving techniques that could be termed "rational."65
Proponents of adjustment apparently assume that actions
taken under uncertainty are sufficiently irrational to justify ju-
dicial intervention because the parties neither have nor could
have struck a bargain worthy of protection. Moreover, propo-
nents of adjustment imply that there is no reason, from the so-
cietal perspective, not to reconstruct the parties' bargain under
these conditions. Although any reallocation affects the wealth
distribution between the parties, if the parties could not foresee
the risk, then neither could have avoided or insured against it,
so no particular allocation has efficiency implications.67
63. See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Con-
tract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
64. See Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra note 10, at 398.
65. The omission carries the same consequences whether the uncertainty
results from limited historical evidence concerning the intervening event at
the time of negotiation, from what the courts may consider unforeseeable
events, or from the limited ability of the actors to digest and assign probabili-
ties to events that are foreseeable. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
66. See Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 881-91.
67. See Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insur-
ance 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 249 (1983).
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2. Bargaining Under Bounded Rationality
This analysis, however, begs the essential question of what
a rational, self-interested actor would do when confronted with
uncertainty. It assumes that parties in such a position can do
little better than to throw up their hands in despair and place
themselves at the mercy of future events and the willingness of
courts to rescue them from the adverse consequences of those
events. "Rational" action is thus limited to those situations in
which actors confront solely conditions of risk or certainty.
Developments in decision theory and organization theory
support the descriptive distinctions between decision making
under risk and under uncertainty.68 They do not, however, nec-
essarily support the conclusion that decisions reached under
uncertainty are less worthy of legal enforcement. This body of
work rejects as inconsistent with human experience and ability
the conditions of omniscient "comprehensive rationality" as-
sumed in classical economic models.69 Instead, the theories rec-
ognize that the limitations of the human mind require that
actors make decisions under conditions of ignorance or, more
neutrally, "bounded rationality."70 The inability to make deci-
sions with complete information or with all the information
necessary to weigh probabilities, however, does not render
human problem solving irrational or unworthy of protection;
instead it requires the decision maker to organize decision-mak-
ing processes and develop simplified models that sensibly adjust
the costs of gathering and computing relevant information. Use
of such models permits both the effective utilization of avail-
able information and the most advantageous development of
currently unavailable information. The combined effect is to
reduce uncertainty or control its consequences and thereby to
enable the decision to be made under conditions as close to cer-
tainty as possible.71
A decision maker may choose among several of these sim-
68. See, e.g., R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 33, at 13. Some more re-
cent theorists tend to classify decisions as made under certainty or under un-
certainty. See, e.g., R. WINKLER, INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN INFERENCE AND
DECISION 220 (1972).
69. See H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 3 (1957) (classical economic models re-
quire "powers of prescience and capacities for computation resembling those
we usually attribute to God.").
70. See, e.g., March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity and the Engineering
of Choice, 9 BELL J. ECON. 587 (1978).
71. H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 80-84, 241 (3d ed. 1976); Simon,
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
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plified models. One such strategy is "satisficing," in which deci-
sion makers deal with the effects of costly information by
seeking a "satisfactory" solution rather than an optimal one.72
Other strategies include making rough guesses of probabilities
and refining those guesses in future circumstances based on his-
torical experience; eliminating all but a small number of factors
from any consideration, even though the omitted factors may
.ultimately determine the value of the outcome;73 or examining
alternatives sequentially until the first satisfactory alternative
is found, even though additional examination might reveal a
more satisfactoi-y alternative.74 Given such strategies, a com-
mercial actor may well make a decision that cannot-given the
limits of the human organism-be improved on in the absence
of additional relevant information. If made consistent with the
abilities and information that the decision maker possesses,
however, a decision made under these circumstances is not
irrational.
Choices made under such circumstances may be heavily
subjective, depending largely on the preferences and desires of
the individuals making them.75 If the decision maker's desires
and preferences are reasonable in light of the information at
hand, even if that information does not fully represent the ac-
tual situation, acts predicated on those beliefs and desires ap-
pear to be rational.76 This is not to say commercial actors
necessarily predict the future through the use of rigorous Baye-
sian calculations. This does suggest, however, that commercial
actors are capable of bargaining in a manner consistent with
their beliefs about future states of the world and that those be-
liefs may, in turn, be predicated on credible preferences and
desires.
Put more strongly, the availability of certain rigorous for-
mulae for making decisions suggests actors could have invested
in such enterprises. Actors may instead invest in strategies
such as satisficing, even though those strategies may systemati-
cally discount low probability events and thus fail to produce
72. H. SIMON, supra note 71, at xxix.
73. Id at xxix-xxx.
74. See, e.g., id at xxx-xxxi; J. MARCH & H. SIMION, supra note 36, at 137-
41; Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 PUB. POL'Y 257, 271-79
(1980).
75. These preferences and desires may be tempered or exacerbated when,
as is likely in most commercial contexts, the decision is made by several indi-
viduals on behalf of a firm.
76. E. EELTS, RATIONAL DECISION AND CAUSALITY 5, 151 (1982).
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optimal results. Should a low probability event then occur, the
actor may regret not having taken more complete steps towards
resolving uncertainty. Unless the failure can be explained as
something other than a purposive act, informed by anterior
speculation on the most highly valued course of action, the jus-
tification for a legal claim for an adjustment obligation imposed
on the other party is unclear. Although at first glance this as-
sertion sounds as though it places on the actor the obligation, at
its peril, to determine all possible future states of affairs, exam-
ination of the available strategies demonstrates that the asser-
tion requires no such harsh result. The full range of possible
strategies will be explored momentarily. To get a flavor of the
options available, however, a strategy might be adopted in
which the actor minimizes its exposure77 by bargaining for an
adjustment clause in the contract 7s rather than simply ac-
cepting the risk of unidentified losses.
Thus, although Supplier may be unable to identify or as-
sign probabilities to all potential risks that threaten its satisfac-
tion with the bargain it strikes, it is capable of simplifying its
choices, eliminating some risks from consideration as inher-
ently improbable, and routinizing others consistent with experi-
ence and guesswork. It may focus on general consequences that
could endanger the value of the contract-shortages, surpluses,
changes in related industries-rather than on more specific
events that could generate these consequences, such as Wash-
ington's and Oregon's secessions from the Union. Armed with
this information about the general consequences, Supplier
could determine possible courses of action, conditions that
might arise, and consequences that might flow from the coinci-
dence of acts and conditions. Supplier could then decide which
consequences are worth contracting to obtain or avoid.
Even if decision making under uncertainty cannot be ex-
pected to produce optimal results, there are presumably supe-
rior and inferior modes of satisficing, reducing alternatives, and
estimating probabilities. Selected strategies may bring the ac-
tual decision closer to one made under conditions of compre-
hensive rationality than others.79 If an actor can, under
conditions of uncertainty, make decisions that approximate to
different degrees decisions made under conditions of certainty,
77. See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 33, at 280-82.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 151-52.
79. See Lindblom, Some Limitations on Rationality: A Comment, in NO-
MOS VII: RATIONAL DECISIoN 224, 227-28 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964).
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its use of that capacity to reach that result presumably would
be preferable, at least to the extent that it could efficiently re-
duce costs associated with uncertainty.8 0 A legal regime that, in
the absence of contrary allocations by the parties, leaves losses
that result from uncertainty where they fall would induce a
party to use the optimal decision-making process available in
light of the costs of that process. Failure to impose the conse-
quences of its rational behavior on a decision maker reduces its
incentive to use its capacity for rational decision making. In ad-
dition, if an actor does not bear the loss, it will have an insuffi-
cient incentive to take the same kind of event into account the
next time it enters into a similar transaction. Although the ac-
tor may fear that the event will thereafter be considered fore-
seeable and thus negotiable under conditions of risk, if the
actor uses past costs-alone as a guide to what must be guarded
against in the future, it will fail to consider the disruptive event
as one against which it must protect itself.81
On the other hand, requiring decision makers to bear the
consequences of their decisions is not likely to yield optimal re-
sults in every case, or even in any case. Instead, the result is
likely, to the extent possible, to draw on past experiences and
present capabilities to allocate losses. In this process, risks are
likely to be grouped together and defined in terms of conse-
quences rather than specific causes.
What the nonadjustment model suggests, therefore, is that
participation in a long-term contract triggers a situation of
strict liability. As with strict liability in tort, which implies no
fault or blameworthiness of the party who causes the loss, the
nonadjustment model implies no miscalculation by the party on
whom the loss falls. Indeed, the failure to allocate all or part of
the loss to another or even to take additional steps to recognize
the possibility of loss may be perfectly reasonable. Just as
strict liability induces the liable party to make an appropriate
analysis of whether the social benefits of its conduct exceed the
social costs by requiring it to internalize both,82 so nonadjust-
ment induces use of the best available process of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. The sole caveat for both is that the
conditions permit some form of analysis of the benefits and
costs associated with the underlying activity that may be de-
80. See Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 344-45 (1924).
81. See Bishop, supra note 67, at 249.
82. See G. CALABREsi, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs 73-75, 135-40 (1970).
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scribed as a "rational" analysis.8 3
E. THE LIMITS OF RATIONAL NEGOTIATION
Proponents of adjustment often charge that leaving unallo-
cated losses where they lie imposes harsh consequences on a
party that could do no better.84 The preceding description of
the decision-making process under uncertainty suggests that
decision makers can improve their efforts and that commercial
transactions will benefit if decision makers are induced to think
about risk allocation of low probability events. This instrumen-
talist view, however, cannot hide the harsh results when an
event of remote probability, not the subject of bargaining, actu-
ally materializes. At best, it can justify those results. Conse-
quently, if the instrumentalist goals that justify nonadjustment
were incapable of being achieved, judicial intervention would
be more appropriate to avoid such harshness. The following
sections examine two situations that could theoretically frus-
trate the nonadjustment model's attempt to improve decision
making and conclude that neither limitation applies to long-
term supply contracts.
1. Non-Recurring Transactions
The nonadjustment model describes an incremental, trial-
and-error process in which the actors have sufficient stake in
the outcome that they will seek to discover remote risks and in
which they will have future opportunities to apply the lessons
83. There is, of course, substantial debate concerning strict liability for
unforeseeable events in tort. Professor Alan Schwartz has recently suggested
that imposition of liability for risk that could not have been discovered with an
optimal amount of research would fail to reduce accidents and would Impose
additional costs on the legal system without furthering any other goal appro-
priate to tort law. See A. Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure
and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship (forth-
coming) (copy on file with the author). The New Jersey Supreme Court ap-
peared to endorse liability for unforeseeable harms, see Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202-08, 447 A.2d 539, 545-49 (1982) (manufac-
turer of asbestos liable although it could not have known of danger), but has
retreated from that position, see Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, No. A-70
(N.J. July 30, 1984) (test is whether manufacturer should have known of dan-
ger); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 182-84, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983)
(same). The case for judicially imposed adjustment of losses from unforesee-
able events in tort is strengthened by the relative inability of tort victims to
bargain before the fact about the allocation of unforeseeable risks.
84. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 50, at 64; Schwartz, supra note 60, at 6-8;
Comment, supra note 10, at 1001.
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learned from previous decisions.8 5 For the model to be success-
ful, the level to which actors bound by its conclusions will in-
vest in the discovery and elimination of risks must be relatively
high. Obviously, this process is appropriate primarily when the
decision at issue is a recurring one or where the investment re-
quired by the decision is substantial. In those situations, there
is justification for the implicit assumptions of the model that
actors (1) invest in search and receive feedback concerning the
sufficiency of protective measures they and others have taken
to deal with remote risks, (2) process that information, and (3)
apply the information to new transactions. If the form of trans-
action is not repeated, the lesson is learned too late to be of use-
ful application; if the transaction does not require substantial
investment, avoidance of remote risks will not justify substan-
tial search costs. The long-term supply contract between com-
mercial actors appears particularly suited to the analysis.
Parties to these contracts engage in the same type of transac-
tion on numerous occasions, extending over a significant period
of time. They therefore expose themselves repeatedly to the
risks of the transaction, giving them both the incentive to dis-
cover the existence and probability of risks and greater access
to the information necessary to those discoveries. Repeated in-
volvement in similar transactions increases each actor's chance
of falling victim to a risk; continued participation in the activity
decreases the marginal cost of discovering the risks that attend
the activity. Even if a given actor does not directly confront a
risk, that actor will probably be familiar with other contracts in
the industry, particuarly those that led to unfortunate results
for one in its position, and it will learn from those situations.
The party to a "one-shot" transaction, the discrete entrant
into the market who purchases goods, never to return, faces far
greater marginal costs in defining or analyzing the risks or in
meeting others who can assit in that effort. That these actors
will help foster commercially "rational" decision making is
doubtful. Even if the cost of a particular discrete transaction
were sufficiently high to warrant investment in the discovery of
information, the availability of information is questionable. A
discrete entrant has little incentive to report its discoveries to
other potential entrants, because it can expect little personal
benefit and some cost to attach to its efforts.86
85. See supra note 56.
86. Even if such discrete entrants into the market wish to report their ex-




The second circumstance that would probably frustrate the
model follows from the assumption that decisions made under
bounded rationality bear some meaningful relationship to the
circumstances that subsequently arise. Reactions to uncer-
tainty are not expected to be optimal but are expected to pro-
duce reliable results. If such decisions are not simply suspect
or unrefined but intuitively and inevitably so off the mark that
they are misleading, then no valid reason exists, other than the
value of a flat administrative rule, to enforce bargains made
under such circumstances. No improvement in the risk alloca-
tion process will result. Thus, if commercial actors failed to
consider certain risks not as part of a rational decision-making
process subject to subsequent improvement and refinement but
because the actors were psychologically incapable of con-
fronting the existence of those risks, application of the model
would be inappropriate.
Literature concerning reactions of individuals facing situa-
tions of risk and uncertainty indicates that such circumstances
do exist. Individuals, wishing to think well of themselves and
believing that it would be irrational to confront situations
fraught with risk, may rationalize their willingness to enter
into such situations through cognitive dissonance; that is, by de-
nying that the risk exists, notwithstanding substantial evidence
to the contrary.8 7 If commercial actors will predictably create
barriers that preclude meaningful recognition or evaluation of
risks, the intervention of a more objective evaluator is appro-
priate to correct the inherently flawed decision-making
process.88
serves as an effective repository of such information. Consumers, therefore,
are considered not to have developed effective information networks about
product quality and merchants. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The
Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 31-32 (1970). Within a lim-
ited geographical area, consumer picketing of a particular merchant may fill
the informational void. Cf. Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boy-
cott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for American Law,
93 YALE L.J. 409, 421-22 (1984) (arguing that consumer boycotts should be pro-
tected because they enable the individual to affect the economy).
87. See J. BREHM & A. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
3-7, 232-44 (1962); Akerlof & Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cogni.
tive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1982).
88. Akerlof & Dickens, supra note 87, at 308. For instance, even those
who argue that tort liability rules should be predicated on a determination of
who is in a superior position to calculate the costs and benefits of a given
course of conduct recognize that the inquiry must take into account the possib-
lity that an actor nominally occupying that position will be unable realistically
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There is reason to believe, however, that cognitive disso-
nance does not pose a serious problem in the context of long-
term commercial contracts. Rejection of a cognition of risk ap-
pears to be most probable where the actor has already invested
significant resources in the enterprise that is now considered
objectively to be risky.89 In such circumstances, risk avoidance
entails both the imposition of substantial financial costs on the
actor, as it would require forgoing sunk costs, and the recogni-
tion that past actions were imprudent. Thus, defenders of job
safety regulation argue that individuals are likely to deny the
presence of risk on the job rather than relinquish the job, as
might be required by a cost-benefit analysis once the risk is ad-
mitted.90 Similarly, people residing in areas with a high risk of
flood or earthquake damage may fail to purchase flood or
earthquake insurance because that would admit the risk under
which they live.91
The issues confronting the commercial actor are of a differ-
ent order. Decisions that ignore or consider the risks of enter-
ing a contract are made during the negotiation stage of the
contract, before substantial costs are invested in the enterprise.
They are unlike the examples above, in which new risk-avoid-
ance mechanisms both become available and are eschewed after
the actor has selected a course of conduct. Thus, a commercial
actor's recognition of the risk would not imply previous impru-
dence that could threaten the actor's self-image; indeed, delib-
eration about how a proposed course of action could produce
adverse consequences in the distant future may signal prudent
behavior.92
Moreover, where risks are recognized, they do not neces-
sarily entail losses of tragic proportions. If a potential long-
term contract were vital to the financial health of the actor, the
risk of losing the deal might be claimed to be great enough to
cause the actor to reject warning signs and therefore to fail to
confront such risks when the deal is implemented. In the next
to consider the risks. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Lia-
bility in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1070-71 (1972); Gillette, Book Review, 60
B.U.L. REv. 383, 389-90 (1980).
89. See Akerlof & Dickens, supra note 87, at 308-10.
90. See i.L at 310.
91. See H. KUNREUTHER, DisASTER INSURANCE PROrECTIoN: PUBUC POL-
icy LESSONS 105-06 (1978). For a recent suggestion that the failure of group at
risk to purchase earthquake insurance is perfectly rational, see Wall St. J.,
Aug. 14, 1984, at 33, col. 1.
92. See T. NAGEL, THE POSsIBMrY OF ALTRUISM 33-37 (1978).
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section of this Article, however, several low-cost mechanisms
that commercial actors can use to allocate the risk of remote
but destructive events will be suggested.93 If such mechanisms
exist, then commercial actors do not face the "tragic choice"
that appears to generate dissonance. The absence of a need to
confront such a choice may underlie the conclusion of some re-
searchers that "[i]n most economic transactions there is no gain
to rationalizing and cognitive dissonance plays no role."94
An equally serious concern, however, emerges from the
psychological literature sugesting that judgments made under
uncertainty are affected by perceptual shortcuts, or heuristics,
that systematically generate errors in decision making. This
literature suggests that individuals misestimate the occurrence
of low-probability events and may fail entirely to provide for
future surprises in a manner endemic to human cognitive and
analytical processes.95 To some commentators, these con-
straints on the reliability of human prediction indicate the need
for postagreement intervention or for an increased imposition
of risk-sharing devices on contracting parties.96 At the very
least, this literature raises questions about the ability of actors
to eliminate errors in prediction that are rooted in innate
perceptual limitations.
Whether these limitations infect all classes of actors
equally, however, is not entirely clear. Most of the application
of this work to the law has concerned the ability of consumers
to make reasoned choices based on limited information.97 The
laboratory experiments that provided the psychological data
have involved subjects who have little interest in the outcome
of their responses other than for the purposes of the immediate
experiment. Their incentive to "get it right" is bordered by a
relatively low horizon, such as a small reward or self-satisfac-
tion.98 Although these motivations may parallel those involved
93. See infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
94. Akerlof & Dickens, supra note 87, at 308.
95. For a collection of the underlying psychological literature, see D.
KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC & A. TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982). For an application to contract law, see Farber,
Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 303, 332 (1983).
96. See Farber, supra note 95, at 335-39.
97. See id. at 329-33 (warranty disclaimers for consumer goods); Schwartz
& Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Exam-
ples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1435-46 (1983)
(consumer goods' failure rates and default rates on consumer borrowing).
98. See Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychol-
ogy of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 457 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Tversky &
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in the everyday situations the experimenters appear to be in-
terested in, the motivations may also reflect a greater willing-
ness to use heuristic devices that may systematically create
error in the result rather than to invest additional resources to
ensure the correctness of the result.99 This latter course of ac-
tion, however, may be more common in commercial actors who
negotiate at length inevitably uncertain, long-term contracts. 00
Correspondingly, the problem of systematic error generated by
the use of heuristic devices is less in that context.' 0
Even if commercial actors are no more willing or able than
consumers to "get it right," there may be less reason to inter-
vene in an incorrect commercial judgment than is advocated for
the consumer transaction. The reasons for this reluctance oc-
cupy much of the following section of this Article; in short,
commercial actors may be in a position to guard, either through
commercial insurance or through explicit agreements for risk
sharing, against the adverse effects of uncertainty. Where
Kahneman, Framing] (data obtained from university students who answered
"brief questionnaires" in a classroom setting); Tversky & Kahneman, Judg-
ment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1130 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment] ("subjects were en-
couraged to be accurate and were rewarded for the correct answers"); see also
Lopes, supra note 38, at 142-43 (pointing out failure of psychological decision
theory to evaluate responses in light of participants' goals and aspirations).
Participants in laboratory experiments may simply be trying to please or help
the experimenters. See R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE AcTION 30 (1982).
99. See Cohen, Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demon-
strated?, 4 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 317, 323-25 (1981).
100. Professors Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde note the possible limits
of their reliance on cognitive theory to interpret the propriety of legal rules:
' Thought processes that routinely generate errors when persons are perform-
ing discrete, relatively simple tasks may work well in environments in which
the actors make continuous decisions and receive feedback or in environments
of great complexity." Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 97, at 1435 n.77.
101. Some of the psychological literature suggests that commercial actors
may overestimate the likelihood of low probability events. Professors Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman suggest that people assess the frequency of an
event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.
Tversky & Kahneman, Judgmen4 supra note 98, at 1127. This "availability"
heuristic suggests that once a low probability event like an oil embargo occurs,
its consequences will be provided for in subsequent contracts as actors attach
an unrealistically high probability to its recurrence. Tversky and Kahneman
also suggest that people discount the value of an uncertain outcome by a "deci-
sion weight" that varies from the probability of the event as dictated by utility
theory. They further conclude that low probability events are overweighted so
that the decision weight applied to such an event exceeds the event's objective
probability. See Tversky & Kahneman, Framing, supra note 98. at 454;
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 281-84 (1979).
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these possibilities are forgone, bearing the risk that adverse ef-
fects will subsequently materialize may constitute a purposive
and important part of the actors' entrepreneurial activity. In
such a situation, less need or justification exists for state inter-
vention in the form of legal rules to "correct" the decision
maker's choice.
II. CHALLENGES TO THE MODEL: THE ARGUMENTS
FOR A DUTY TO ADJUST
An advocate of a duty to adjust might agree that the above
model of decision making under uncertainty is descriptively ac-
curate but deny that it explains, from a normative perspective,
the legal system's proper response to that process. After occur-
rence of a disruptive and uncertain event, the law could com-
pensate for the inadequacies of the ex ante decision, regardless
of their source, by adjusting the bargain to reflect what the par-
ties would have done under conditions of certainty or risk. The
law could, in effect, save the parties from the consequences of
uninformed decisions even though they "did their best" or had
an opportunity to "do their best" at the decision-making stage.
Alternatively, the law may be relatively unconcerned about the
welfare of the individual parties but concerned about the ef-
fects of their bargain on others. If bounded rationality or deci-
sion models predicated on subjective expected utilities of
various outcomes preclude realization of a societally optimal al-
location of resources, ex post intervention to achieve that state
of affairs may be appropriate. This section will discuss more
specifically two normative principles that underlie a duty to ad-
just, demonstrating in the process that, although these values
may require refinement of the nonadjustment model, they do
not support its abrogation.
A. THE RELATIONSHIP ARGUMENT
1. The Nature of the Relational Model
The nonadjustment model assumes that each party to a
contract has dickered about terms to the extent necessary to
serve its self-interest.102 The model also assumes that this bar-
gaining takes place against an individualistic background in
which each party is permitted to pursue its own welfare. Self-
interest, however, is not synonymous with apathy for the inter-
ests of others. Each party must consider the possibility that its
102. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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trading partner will willingly compromise when a risk not bar-
gained about materializes. Self-interest may mandate a bar-
gained term of mutual assistance, especially if a party believes
itself more likely to need subsequent assistance than its trading
partner. All that the model requires is that issues of prudence
be resolved by reference to self-interest.
This model stands in contrast to a model of commercial ar-
rangements involving what many have denominated "relational
contracts."03 Relational contracts are characterized by long-
term arrangements, heightened uncertainty at the negotiation
stage about future consequences of present acts, and the invest-
ment of resources unique to the transaction with which the
contract deals. For proponents of the relational model, the re-
lationship between the parties to such a contract creates obliga-
tions that transcend written terms. Implicit in the relationship
is an interdependence that transforms each actor from one who
is wholly self-interested to one committed to maximizing the
welfare of what becomes a "joint enterprise.1 04
103. Development of the relational model is usually attributed to Professor
Ian Macneil. See I. MACNEIL, THE NEv SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CoNTRAcTuAL RELATIONS (1980); Macneil, Values in Contract: Inter-
nal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 340 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Macneil,
Values]; Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv.
854 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Macneil, Contracts]; Macneil, The Many Fu-
tures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Macneil,
Many Futures]; Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation,
60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Macneil, Restatement].
104. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 14, at 1092. One advocate of adjustment
explains the basis for the interdependence of parties in relational contracts as
follows:
In many exchange transactions, some aspects of the projection are
complete and some are not. In a twenty year contract for the supply
of coal, the subject, pricing formula, method of delivery, and duration
may be spelled out. The relationship is relatively impersonal, tangible
exchange is important, and a competitive market for coal may exist.
On the other hand, the length of the contract puts strains on any ef-
fort to achieve complete initial projection. Despite careful negotia-
tions and detailed planning, the initial agreement will probably fail to
keep pace with change. At the same time, the transaction, because of
high exit costs and specialized reliance, may be removed from the
market. When these features are understood, the relational dimen-
sions of the transaction come into sharper focus. For example, the
possibility of trouble caused by change will be expected as normal
(although the precise nature and impact will be unknown), and flexi-
bility, cooperation, and adjustment will be regarded as essential. Both
parties should understand at the outset that the long-term viability of
the contract will depend upon continuing cooperation in performance
and subsequent planning. In Macneil's scheme, these features of the
long-term contract are relational rather than discrete.
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The investment of specialized resources in relational con-
tracts creates opportunities for the parties to take advantage of
each other's position once the transaction is implemented.
When a contract does not involve specialized resources, either
party may leave the contract and reenter the market at a rela-
tively low cost.105 Opportunistic behavior by either party can
be detected and remedied by comparison to other transactions
in the market. When parties begin to invest resources in one
transaction that are not readily transferable to other transac-
tions, however, they cannot exit from the contract without sac-
rificing their investment and therefore leave themselves open
to strategic moves by the other party.10 6 As the relationship
progresses and conditions change, each party, if unconstrained
by principles of relational contract law, will attempt to seize as
much of the gain and avoid as much of the loss generated by
changed circumstances as possible.107
Simultaneously, at least according to some who subscribe
to the relational model, a countervailing development occurs.
As the relationship develops, it creates an atmosphere of mu-
tual trust and adaptability between the parties; they become de-
pendent on each other and solicitous of each other's needs.108
Because investments of physical and human capital cannot be
readily transferred to other transactions, initial costs return ex-
pected benefits only if the parties maintain their relation-
ship.109 If these aspects of the relationship can be used to fill
the inevitable contractual gaps created by uncertainty at the
bargaining stage, an efficient allocation of risks may be ex-
Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra note 10, at 401-02.
105. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contrac-
tual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233, 239 (1979) ("[B]uyers in these circum-
stances can easily turn to alternative sources, and suppliers can sell output
intended for one order to other buyers without difficulty." (citation omitted)).
106. Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 1002 (1983).
107. An example of opportunistic behavior in the long-term supply con-
tract context may be found in Fratelli Gardino, S.p.A v. Caribbean Lumber
Co., 587 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1979). Seller had agreed to ship a certain quantity of
lumber to buyer and subsequently claimed that insufficient shipping facilities
were available to meet contract requirements. The court rejected a U.C.C. § 2-
615 contention of excuse when it discovered that the seller had a sister com-
pany that was able to provide facilities but that had apparently favored other
contracts that commanded a higher price.
108. See Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 567, 569-73 (1983).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
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pected to exist at all times during the contract. 1 0 Beyond effi-
ciency, gap filling by reference to the relationship also serves
norms of respect for others, preserving the relationship and
harmonizing conflict.In Recognition of potential gains if these
aspects of the relationship dominate has caused some to pro-
pose legal rules that neutralize opportunistic behavior within
the relationship while fostering the mutual reliance and confi-
dence that stimulates continuation of the relationship.112
The relational model, then, recognizes the existence of un-
certainty but confronts it in a very different manner from the
individualist model of nonadjustment. In the relational model,
reassuring interdependence compensates for present ignorance
of contingencies that precludes fully informed risk allocations.
The parties pledge to cooperate in the future not only with re-
spect to agreed-on performance"3 but also with respect to
resolving difficulties not anticipated at the negotiation stage.
By construing the parties' agreement to contain an implicit
promise to assist one another when a disruptive event arises,
the relational model expresses a preference for resolution of
conflict through compromise and conciliation rather than
through adversity and litigation. It is a heroic vision, almost
utopian in its implications for the mutual obligations of con-
tracting parties. The commentators' language describing the
ensuing relationship reflects the parties' interdependence. Far
from adversaries, parties to a relational contract stand in a
"quasi-fiduciary" relationship to one another;"4 they are in a
"moral partnership" or an arrangement with a "partnership-
like quality,""5 a "minisociety with a vast array of norms be-
yond the norms centered on exchange and its immediate
processes."6 As partners, legal or moral, and as fiduciaries,
each party owes the other a duty to adjust the original bargain
110. Williamson, supra note 105, at 239-42.
111. Macneil, Values, supra note 103, at 360.
112. As an example of how legal rules might capture the benefits of the
relation, Professors Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott suggest that courts
attempting to infuse "best efforts" clauses with a more concrete standard of
performance look for that level of performance that maximizes the output of
all parties to the transaction, even if that point varies from the one that would
maximize one of the parties individual welfare. Goetz & Scott, supra note 14,
at 1112-17.
113. U.C.C. § 2-311(3) imposes an obligation to cooperate where necessary
to accomplish an agreed performance.
114. Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra note 10, at 407.
115. Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL L. REv. 573, 575, 586
(1983).
116. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 103, at 901.
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when a contingency arises that was not allocated and that
would render the agreement unduly unfavorable to the other
party.11 7
2. The Validity of the Relational Model
The relational model suggests that parties who act oppor-
tunistically are chiselingi'S at the core of the relationship.
Maintaining the relationship requires legal principles that the
aggrieved party may use to force the opportunistic actor back
into consideration of joint interests. This invocation of law to
require adjustment between the parties to relational contracts
rests on two often unstated assumptions: first, that opportu-
nism will cause an undesirable breakdown of the relation in the
absence of constraints and, second, that uncertainty prevents
the parties from providing the necessary constraints at the ne-
gotiation stage. Although the first assumption may be accurate,
it does not lead inexorably to the adoption of a duty to adjust.
The reason for this is that the second assumption fails to recog-
nize self-help remedies that the parties may employ to main-
tain the relationship. Given the assumption of self-interest,'19
opportunistic behavior is to be expected. Insofar as opportu-
nism merely shifts wealth between the parties without creating
any new wealth, it constitutes undesirable, wasteful activity
from a societal perspective.120 Thus, the desire of advocates of
relationalism to constrain such conduct is well-founded.
Constraints on opportunism, however, may be generated by
forces external to both the law and the contract. Commercial
actors do tend to work out difficulties that result from disrup-
tive events, to renegotiate previously struck bargains, and to re-
solve disputes amicably without resort to legal process. The
written contracts in these cases constitute "a rough indication
around which [real working] relations vary."121 Businesses
draft contracts with seeming inattention to legal consequences,
perhaps out of ignorance, but perhaps with the intention that
117. Goetz & Scott, supra note 106, at 1002.
118. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 14, at 1114-17.
119. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
120. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L.
REV. 521, 522 (1981). Of course, efforts to control opportunistic behavior also
impose costs and, in some instances, those costs could exceed benefits by intro-
ducing uncertainty about the scope of contractual obligations in all commercial
contracts. See Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981
DUKE L.J. 619, 664-65.
121. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704, 737 (1931).
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extralegal measures will resolve any problems that arise.' 2
Much of the motivation for these adjustments may he in the re-
lational interdependence of the parties and a sense that devel-
opment of commercial practice favors modification and
disfavors litigation in light of new circumstances. 2
More pragmatic considerations also encourage adjustment
and discourage dissolution of the relationship. The parties may
recognize that the uniqueness of their relationship makes any
substitution with another actor more difficult and more expen-
sive to obtain.32 4 As the parties invest resources specific to the
transaction and exit becomes more expensive, the parties create
a bilateral monopoly-each side desires something that can be
obtained only from the other party without incurring prohibi-
tive costs.'2s When a disruptive event occurs, the disadvantaged
party may regret its initial involvement in the transaction, but
it is not without leverage. Because the advantaged party has
also invested resources in the creation and maintenance of the
relationship, the advantaged party has incentives to adjust vol-
untarily, as long as the cost of adjustment is less than the cost
of creating a replacement relationship.
These voluntary adjustments may still involve costly rene-
gotiations as advantaged and disadvantaged parties opportunis-
tically reallocate the gains of the transaction.2 6 A legal
obligation that enforces the adjustment goal may then be de-
fended as a means of reducing "costly haggling."12 By no
means clear, however, is the conclusion that imposition of a
122. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 A?. SOC.
REV. 55, 58-59 (1963); Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Man-
ufacturing Industry, PRAC. LAW., Nov. 1963, at 14-15; Mueller, Contract Reme-
dies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 833, 836; White,
supra note 24, at 14-18.
123. See Liewellyn, supra note 121, at 718 ("Promise, performance and ad-
justment are in this sense primarily extra-legal. It needs no argument that if
they did not normally occur without laws' intervention, no regime of future
dealings would be possible."); White, supra note 24, at 16-17.
124. See Williamson, supra note 105, at 240.
125. Id. at 241; see Gottlieb, supra note 108, at 570 ("The degree of mutual
dependence between lenders and [sovereign] borrowers is such that neither
side can escape unhurt if the other fails.").
126. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 106, at 982-83. Of course, the expected
cost of renegotiation may be factored into the original transaction. This may
be particularly true where renegotiation is an accepted part of a course of deal-
ing, as in the case of rescheduling debts of foreign nations. See Gottlieb, supra
note 108, at 572-73.
127. Williamson, supra note 105, at 242; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note
106, at 1002 (common law courts have created doctrines applicable to certain
contracts incorporating both performance and readjustment responsibilities).
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legal obligation to adjust will reduce haggling. If the bilateral
monopoly exists, the issue is not whether the parties will ad-
just, but what the new bargain will look like. Negotiations are
directed to that issue, and the outcome is no more certain when
the parties bargain under threat of legal sanction than when
they bargain voluntarily. Thus, it is not clear that imposition of
a duty to adjust reduces postevent negotiation costs below those
expectable from voluntary bargains for adjustment.128
The frequency of adjustment in the relational model sug-
gests another extralegal device that reduces the need for a legal
obligation to adjust in order to maintain the relationship. If ad-
justment is the standard, then a nonadjusting party incurs
reputational injury by its refusal to adjust. Although some
have argued that relational contracts do not trigger reputa-
tional concerns because of their specialized nature,129 just the
opposite may be true. Because the termination of long-term re-
lationships causes greater dislocation than the termination of
more discrete transactions,130 actors may choose their partners
in such arrangements with greater care. Thus, a reputation for
mutual assistance may be an important asset in these transac-
tions.131 Due to the long-term nature of relational contracts,
parties might be reluctant to deal with anyone who has a tar-
nished reputation132 and more willing to invest resources to de-
128. Moreover, even if the obligation exists, a party who seeks to enforce
the contract as written rather than adjust is subject to the promisor's threat
not to perform. Under U.C.C. § 2-716(1), specific performance for a breach of
contract to sell goods is available "where the goods are unique or In other
proper circumstances." Mere increase in price is generally insufficient, be-
cause the aggrieved party can be made whole by money damages. Thus, in the
absence of a more liberal allowance for specific performance, imposition of a
legal obligation cannot ensure the continuation of an otherwise defunct
relationship.
129. Goetz & Scott, supra note 106, at 1013 n.122.
130. Cf. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 103, at 876-80 (contrasting possible
consequences of discrete and long-term contracts).
131. Reputation may similarly compensate for the inability of actors to
write a contract that provides for all possible states of the world that could
subsequently materialize. See Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics:
The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 275-78
(1984). On the role of reputation as a governance device in contract law gener-
ally, see Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 691, 693-95 (1983); Leff, supra note 86, at 24-26.
132. Similarly, supply contracts may exist with more than one party at a
time, and reputational injury incurred in one transaction may well carry over
into the other transactions and jeopardize the nonadjusting party's other rela-
tionships. See Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A
Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91, 98 n.22 (1979).
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termine whether a potential trading partner's reputation is
tarnished. Thus, present offers to adjust may not only save the
current relationship but expedite the formation of future ones.
3. Ex Ante Allocational Devices
In short, parties to relational commercial transactions seem
to be those most capable of making and motivated to make de-
terminations required by conditions of uncertainty. This con-
clusion suggests they are least in need of judicial enforcement
of an obligation to adjust.133 Proponents of adjustment may
nevertheless object that if adjustment is the norm in long-term
contracts, a refusal to adjust may present a victim with unfair
surprise. If a party has been lulled by a custom and practice of
adjustment, the obligation described by the custom and practice
ought to be implied in all such contracts.13 4 The state, there-
fore, may intervene to protect the expectations of a party that
it would not be left in the lurch by a trading partner after oc-
currence of a disruptive event. 3 5
This argument, however, may prove too much. The exist-
ence of a custom and practice of adjustment in a particular con-
tractual setting indicates that parties in that setting are
comfortable with the allocation of risks that flow from that cus-
133. Evidence that parties to relational contracts are willing to adjust origi-
nal contract terms in the face of changed circumstances is found in Palay,
supra note 131, at 279-85. Professor Thomas M. Palay indicates that parties to
long-term contracts with idiosyncratic investment characteristics have special-
ized governance mechanisms that permit the parties to work out potentially
disruptive problems. See id. at 287. What is interesting about the contracts
Palay studies is that they involved agreements unenforceable in a court of law
and presumably known to be so by the parties. Thus, the threat of legal sanc-
tion played no role in keeping the parties together. That role was therefore
delegated to private mechanisms such as the profit incentive, good business re-
lations, and reputation.
134. See U.C.C. § 1-205. On the derivation of rights from a practice in the
contractual context, see P. ATIYAH, PROMsSEs, MORAis AND LAW 106-22 (1981).
135. Neither legal nor extralegal constraints prevent the ultimate break-
down between parties to relational contracts in all cases. On the other hand, it
has never been assumed even by those who value highly the continuation of
relations that relational contracts never terminate unhappily. See Macneil,
Contracts, supra note 103, at 899-900. Thus, the issue for those who would im-
pose a legal duty to adjust is whether marginal gains would result with a legal
adjustment obligation. At this point, however, the whole notion of enforcing a
legal obligation to save the transaction seems a bit incongruous. If matters
have gone so far, notwithstanding all the extralegal constraints, there probably
is little of the relation left to save. This is reminiscent of the justification for
interfamily tort immunity predicated on maintaining harmony within a family
whose members seek legal redress against one another. See Briere v. Briere,
107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966).
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tom. Enforcement of the custom recognizes the implicit risk al-
location without requiring the parties to incur the costs of
making that allocation explicit. The ability of parties implicitly
to agree to adjust if a disruptive event materializes, however,
belies the second assumption of the relational model, that un-
certainty prevents the parties from controlling opportunism at
the negotiation stage. 36 The need for a state-imposed duty pre-
sumably would dissipate if parties, acting under uncertainty,
could reach ex ante agreements that implicitly or explicitly al-
locate the risk of subsequent events. 37 Thus, if parties can,
through a recognized custom or practice, implicitly allocate
risks under conditions of uncertainty, then perhaps they can
also make explicit allocations in the absence of a custom or
practice. If such is the case, the argument for adjustment as a
legal obligation seems weaker still.138
The kinds of arrangements the parties could negotiate to
neutralize subsequent strategic behavior may be examined in
the proposed transaction between Supplier and Printer. As-
sume that Supplier would like to lock Printer into a long-term
relationship to ensure a steady market for its output. Never-
theless, Supplier is aware that a variety of events that it cannot
currently quantify or identify may undermine the profitability
of any contractual arrangement it currently enters and fears
that Printer may seize on a subsequent event to Supplier's
disadvantage.
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, Supplier would be will-
ing to participate if it could reduce to an acceptable level the
possibility that, should such an event occur, Printer would
favor its own interests over those of Supplier. In short, Sup-
plier, although ignorant of future events or incapable of calcu-
lating their probability or their effect, would like to find a
solution that controls the consequences of future events. What
decision strategies might Supplier adopt?
Supplier could expend significant resources in contemplat-
ing, quantifying, and allocating the risk of every event that
might materialize during the contract term. It could attempt to
136. See supra text accompanying note 118-20.
137. Goetz & Scott, supra note 14, at 1116-17.
138. Of course, the ability of the parties to structure a bargain raises ques-
tions about the efficacy of any state-imposed clause, since parties may bargain
to another solution. See supra text accompanying notes 118-37; iqifra text ac-
companying notes 139-54. At this point, this ability is used only to test the as-
sumption of the relational model that uncertainty precludes rational allocation
of risk in relational settings.
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identify consequences of contractual terms under specific condi-
tions, assign probabilities to each condition and values to each
consequence, and select the term that promises the highest sub-
jective expected utility from the resulting matrix.139 The con-
cept of bounded rationality, however, suggests that some risks
will remain unidentified and unquantified.140 Moreover, even if
the parties could identify and quantify all risks, the costs of
those processes and of negotiating with respect to them would
probably outweigh the expected loss from a remote risk.
If the only choices are to ignore uncertainty or to attempt
to bargain to the point where all risks are identified and allo-
cated, Supplier may take the former course and, if any disrup-
tive event occurs, hope to persuade a court to resolve any
dispute after the fact by any means, including adjustment,
deemed reasonable. Supplier is not, however, faced with these
choices alone. Supplier could adopt a variety of contractual
clauses embodying other decision strategies. Organization the-
ory suggests that commercial actors can select from among
these clauses one that is "good enough" to achieve the desired
outcome. Once that selection occurs, the crucial issue is no
longer the factual question of whether the parties considered a
specific risk but the normative question of whether the law
should respect decisions made by the parties concerning the
manner in which they deal with a recognized inability to spec-
ify all risks. The analysis above suggests that the answer de-
pends on whether the parties had opportunities to allocate the
risks consistent with their beliefs about the effects of uncer-
tainty. The bargaining that typically precedes the creation of a
long-term contract suggests that those opportunities are sub-
stantial enough to preclude judicial reallocation.141
Supplier, for instance, may be particularly averse to un-
identified or unquantified risks that it could suffer from a dis-
ruptive event. Such an aversion, however, would not
necessarily lead Supplier to eschew the entire transaction or to
139. This mode of decision making would be consistent with Bayesian deci-
sion theory. See E. EFLLS, supra note 76, at 4-23. For critiques of applying
Bayesian analysis to legal rules, see Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quan-
titative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 116, 135-52 (1979);
Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456,
1464-81 (1979); Tribe, Trial By Mathematics" Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1332-76 (1971).
140. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
141. See, eg., Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.
1971) (failure of parties to agree on clause covering undelivered phosphate af-
ter bargaining about the issue indicates willingness to accept trade custom).
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proceed, with fingers crossed, hoping that a relational judge de-
cides the case if adjustment becomes desirable. Instead, Sup-
plier would be able to negotiate the contract using decision
strategies that take into account its particular risk aversion.
These strategies would follow a "maximin" criterion, by which
Supplier attempts to maximize the value of the minimum posi-
tion in which it would find itself should a disruptive event in-
terfere, even if choices consistent with that criterion leave open
the possibility that Supplier will be worse off if a disruptive
event does not occur.142
Pursuit of a maximin strategy, however, does not lead in-
exorably to a single type of contractual clause; the commercial
actor must consider which among several clauses will provide it
with the greatest net benefit should a disruptive event occur.
Supplier, for instance, might try to preempt any opportunistic
conduct by Printer by including a clause that permits Supplier
to exercise sole discretion should the materialization of an un-
specified risk make complete performance unprofitable.143 As-
suming that Printer would attempt to exact a high price in the
contract for such discretion, Supplier would probably be re-
quired to sacrifice some of the expected gain from the contract
in order to avoid a remote probability of a loss. Nevertheless,
evidence exists that commercial parties seek such control. In
his study of allocation of production in chemical supply con-
142. See R. LucE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 33, at 278-80. Assume, for in-
stance, that Supplier believes that if no disruptive event occurs, the contract
will be worth 20, but that if a disruptive event occurs the contract will be
worth -10. It believes that the event as likely as not will occur, i.e., a .5
probability. Assume further that at the negotiation stage, Supplier can bargain
for either of two clauses that will govern should the event occur: to share
gains and losses equally with Printer or to permit gains and losses to remain
where they fall. Supplier thus confronts the following payoff matrix:
Event No Event
Share 1/2(.5 X -10) = -2.5 1/2(.5 X 20) = 5
Do Not Share (.5 x -10) = -5 (.5 x 20) = 10
Under a maximin strategy, Supplier will choose to share because sharing will
minimize its maximum loss should the event occur, even though it thereby
surrenders the possiblity of a greater gain in the event that it does not share
and no disruptive event occurs.
143. For instance, a party might bargain for the right to terminate the rela-
tionship at any time, a power likely to be exercised when demand for the
product that is the subject of the contract declines. See, e.g., Cardinal Stone
Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1982); Corenswet, Inc. v.




tracts after shortages made full performance impracticable,
Professor James White found numerous attempts by sellers to
reserve to themselves the major role in the allocation pro-
cess. 44 A few of these contracts purported to permit the seller
the right to allocate in any manner without regard to the inter-
ests of the other party. 45 The relatively small number of at-
tempts to retain complete control suggests that if sellers
considered this type of clause at all, .they either were unwilling
to pay the price of such a clause or were concerned that such a
clause would not be enforced even if included.
Abandonment of this particular clause, however, does not
require abandonment of a maximin strategy. Supplier might
try other tactics for minimizing potential losses, such as bar-
gaining for a clause that obligates Printer to take account of
Supplier's interests or that induces Printer to treat Supplier's
interests as its own. Supplier could, for instance, explicitly con-
tract for a fiduciary relationship in which each party is obli-
gated to place the mutual interests of the parties in the
enterprise in which they join above their personal interests.
This could be accomplished by creating a partnership or joint
venture to provide for the supply of paper from Supplier to
Printer. The variety of linkages that might unify the interests
of the parties, and thus minimize the risk that Printer will act
strategically at Supplier's expense, extends all the way to the
point at which Supplier and Printer merge into a single, verti-
cally integrated firm so that the interests of the parties are
coterminous. 146
As Supplier moves along the spectrum of linkages, how-
ever, it necessarily surrenders part of its independence, re-
stricts its ability to deal with other customers that compete
with Printer, and subjects itself to costly regulatory schemes
that might be avoided if separate operations are maintained.147.
144. White, supm note 24, at 6-10.
145. Professor James J. White suggested that these attempts to retain com-
plete control over the situation might run afoul of statutory obligations of
"good faith" or "fair dealing." If the overall bargain reflected that chemical
purchasers were compensated for the possibility of subsequently abdicating
control over allocations, however, it would be difficult to demonstrate where
bad faith had existed. See id at 8.
146. Of course, even within the same firm Supplier and Printer would face
difficulties of monitoring each other's behavior to ensure compliance with the
objective of maximizing joint interest rather than individual interest. See Jen-
sen & Meckling, supra note 28, at 305.
147. See Goldberg, supra note 132, at 102-03. For instance, vertical integra-
tion may trigger antitrust inquiries that the actors would prefer to avoid.
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Attempts to find a convenient midpoint along the spectrum are
also likely to be costly. For instance, Supplier might bargain
for a requirements term that permits it to supply all Printer's
paper needs during the contract period. This would provide
Printer with some incentive to work out subsequent price ad-
justments that keep the relationship on an even keel. Never-
theless, the requirements device is not foolproof. Printer may
seek close substitutes for the product it purchases from Sup-
plier and claim that it no longer has "requirements" for Sup-
plier's goods. Conversely, if the contract price of the goods falls
below the expected market price, Printer may increase its "re-
quirements" and stockpile the goods for a time when the mar-
ket price rises.148
Supplier might also attempt to cement the relational ele-
ments of the agreement through an express requirement that
manifests the parties' intent to cooperate. Toward this end,
Supplier might seek a clause that gives both parties a role in
working out the post-event relationship. Most obviously, Sup-
plier could negotiate for a term allowing it to reopen the bar-
gaining if some disruptive event occurs.149 Such a clause would
maintain the independence of the parties, but the factors dis-
cussed above that make exit from the transaction difficult
would induce the advantaged party to be attentive to the wel-
fare of the disadvantaged party or risk dissolution of a profit-
able transaction.
In an alternative attempt to induce mutual aid after a dis-
ruptive event, Supplier may bargain for a standard against
which subsequent conduct may be measured. For instance,
Supplier may bargain for a term that permits it to avoid the
contract with impunity if it cannot satisfy Printer's needs after
exercising "best efforts" towards that end, measured against a
trade custom that identified "best efforts" with maximizing the
joint interests of the parties rather than self-interest. This
clause, too, is problematic in that it largely leaves to a court the
difficult task of measuring the adequacy of post-event perform-
ance. Even where commentators have sought to define more
rigorously the standard of performance required by such a
clause, they have not ignored the practical difficulties of ad-
148. See Homestake Mining Co. v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 476
F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
149. Speidel notes the presence of such clauses in coal supply contracts.
See Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra note 10, at 407 n.167; see also Tannen-
baum, supra note 9; Goldberg, supra note 29.
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ministering a vague standard.150
Each of these tactics is intended to place Supplier in a posi-
tion to reduce losses should it be the victim of a disruptive
event. Although none is cost free, the variety of available
clauses suggests that Supplier is in a position to select in a de-
liberate, rational manner a clause that will best maintain the
relationship in the face of an uncertain future. That strategy
would be suitable if Supplier believed itself relatively likely to
be disadvantaged with the passing of time. But Supplier, acting
under uncertainty, may not suffer from the risk aversion that
leads to adoption of a maximin strategy. Instead, Supplier
might adopt a strategy, consistent with the Principle of Insuffi-
cient Reason, that reflects a belief that a disruptive event is no
more likely to affect it adversely than to affect Printer ad-
versely.151 In the absence of any reason to think its own expo-
sure to disruptive events is greater or less than that of Printer,
150. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 14, at 1M6-17.
151. -See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 33, at 284-86. Attractive as this
strategy may be to a party bargaining under uncertainty, it is not without sig-
nificant costs. The first difficulty arises in trying to categorize the events to
which equal probabilities are to be assigned. Supplier might, as suggested
above, begin by assuming that a disruptive event could be either beneficial or
harmful to it and thus assign a .5 probability to each possibility. Supplier
might, however, adopt a different tactic, attempting to list all the individual
events that might occur and assigning an equal probability to each such event.
Unless the events were equally divided between beneficial and adverse events,
this procedlre would lead to a very different result from the assumption of
equal probability of being harmed or benefitted by a disruptive event. There is
no way, however, to select between the two procedures under a condition of
uncertainty. Robert Wolff makes the same point in his discussion of the Prin-
ciple of Insufficient Reason as an alternative to Rawls's maximin solution for
rational behavior under uncertainty. Wolff suggests that in determining
whether a die will, when tossed, come up with a 4, any of the following proce-
dures may be used consistent with the Principle:
(a) There are six sides to the die, and thus the chance of tossing a 4 is
1/6.
(b) The die will come up a 2, 4, 6, or an odd number, and thus the
probability of a 4 is 1/4.
(c) The die will either come up a 4 or not, and thus the probability of
tossing a 4 is 1/2.
See R_ WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLs 164-65 (1977). Wolff concludes:
If we really are ignorant of the probabilities of various outcomes, then
we have no way of knowing what the proper classification of out-
comes is. Or to put the same point differently, our classification is
simply a summation of our beliefs about the situation, so we cannot
divide the outcomes up and then blandly deny that we know which of
them is more likely.
I&. at 165 (emphasis in original); see R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 33, at
284-85.
Thus, notwithstanding the initial rationality of applying equal probabili-
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Supplier might assign an equal probability to its being ad-
versely or beneficially affected by a disruptive event. Supplier
might adapt to this situation by bargaining for a clause that al-
lowed, but did not require, the advantaged party to adjust and
assist the disadvantaged party. For instance, Supplier might
bargain to peg the contract price to some historical index that it
believes will reflect a proper price for the product or to place a
maximum on subsequent price increases or decreases. Simi-
larly, Supplier could bargain for a "gross inequity" clause, re-
quiring a sharing of information that would permit the
advantaged party to decide whether and how much to assist,
without requiring any assistance whatsoever.152 Finally, Sup-
plier might seek to allocate the risk of uncertainty through se-
lection of a measure of damages for breach of contract.153 If
Supplier chooses a clause implementing a strategy that assumes
either side is equally likely to benefit or suffer from a disrup-
tive event, it has little complaint should the clause subse-
quently fail to minimize its losses. That risk appears to have
been implicitly allocated with the choice of the clause, selected
on the gamble that it would work to Supplier's ultimate advan-
tage.154 Even if Supplier subsequently regrets its assignment of
equal probabilities, it did not act irrationally.
Supplier may also seek to avoid the consequences of disrup-
tive events by appeal to third parties. It may, for instance, bar-
gain for a clause that future disagreements will be submitted to
binding arbitration. Alternatively, it may seek a clause that
permits a court hearing any dispute to "do justice" between the
parties, as determined at the time at which the dispute arises.
The parties may thus take their chances that they will draw a
relational judge. Indeed, the parties may contractually agree
that a judge should use a relational standard in resolving any
dispute between them. Although this tactic may not bind the
judge, it may provide the judge with guidance in any attempt to
implement the expressed intention of the parties.
ties to each possibility, Supplier, aware of the shortcomings of such a strategy,
might reject it as inferior even to a maximin tactic.
152. See Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.
1975); Duesenberg, supra note 9, at 53-54.
153. See Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies. 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 427 passim. (1983).
154. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 432-33
(S.D. Fla. 1975); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 989, 990-92 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 726-28, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
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Neither of these strategies-the maximin criterion or the
Principle of Insufficient Reason--ensures that Supplier, look-
ing back at the end of the contract or after a disruptive event,
will believe it struck the optimal bargain. Each strategy in-
volves costs that may not be recaptured. If no disruptive event
materializes, an actor that compensated its trading partner in
order to occupy a superior position in such an event may regret
its decision; if the event does occur, an actor that gambled on
self-insurance may regret that decision. Still, the availability of
various strategies reflects the ability of actors faced with uncer-
tainty to choose among options and strike bargains consistent
with their estimates of probable consequences and their levels
of risk preference. Consequently, if commercial actors have in-
cluded one of the above clauses in the contract, courts generally
consider~them to have allocated the possibility of a subsequent
disruptive event and decline to second-guess that judgment. In
short, the courts treat such clauses, quite justifiably, as the
product of a rational, deliberate process, worthy of respect, de-
spite the condition of uncertainty at the time of drafting. The
results reached may not be optimal, but they are "good
enough"-good enough to reduce the uncertainty of the parties
to an acceptable level, and good enough to constitute a rational
allocation based on the desires and preferences of the parties
during negotiations that diminishes the need for ex post judi-
cial intervention.
4. Failure to Allocate Risks Ex Ante
The availability of risk-allocation devices under a condition
of uncertainty may provide reasons for courts to avoid interven-
tion where the parties have integrated a device into their agree-
ment, but this leaves open the cases in which no such provision
has been made. Ought the law to presume that the parties de-
sired adjustment to be judicially imposed unless they agreed
otherwise,55 or ought it to presume that the parties desired ad-
justment only when they provided for it specifically? Propo-
nents of adjustment may argue that the presumption should be
in favor of adjustment because several of the decision strategies
for dealing with uncertainty reveal a desire for some level of
risk sharing. The creation of a state-imposed gap filler that re-
flects no sharing, such as avoiding the contract or enforcing it
155. If adjustment were judicially imposed, a court would still have to




as originally drafted, therefore seems incongruous. This incon-
gruity dissipates only if the failure of commercial actors to pro-
vide expressly some loss-sharing mechanism signals a desire
not to share.
The basic premise of this argument is that the parties
would have provided for adjustment had they bargained about
the specific event that occurred.156 The problem with this ap-
proach, however, is evident: lacking omniscience, the courts
are simply not capable of determining with any assurance what
the parties would have provided. The ex post, self-interested,
and probably conflicting testimony of the parties is not likely to
be much help. Consequently, this presumption of agreement to
adjust has been attacked as an effort by the courts to impose
their will on the parties under the pretense of calling it the par-
ties' own. 5 7 Judicial determination of what the parties would
have done seems especially questionable in situations of uncer-
tainty, where ascribing to the parties any contemplation of the
specific event is difficult.
A related argument supporting adjustment, noted at the
outset of this Article,158 is that a legal requirement of adjust-
ment would be appropriate if most commercial parties, left to
bargain between themselves concerning uncertainty, would
agree to adjust when events of low probability intervene to
skew the original expectations. If such were the case, a legal
rule imposing that same clause on parties who were otherwise
silent on the issue would make such agreements unnecessary
and thus reduce transaction costs. The variety of clauses dis-
cussed above, however, and apparently used in the more fully
bargained contracts that characterize relational commercial
transactions, indicates that no clear majority rule exists with
respect to clauses that attempt to deal with uncertainty.159
Consequently, there is no easily recognizable clause which, if
156. Professor Farnsworth quotes Jeremy Bentham for the proposition,
with which Farnsworth disagrees, that courts should remedy "the shortsight-
edness of individuals by doing for them what they would have done for them
selves [sic] had their imagination anticipated the march of nature." Farns-
worth, supra note 13, at 879 (quoting J. BENTHAM, A General View of a Com-
plete Code of Laws, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 191 (Bowring ed.
1848)); see also Schlegel, supra note 27, at 443 ("[Ilt is difficult to understand
how the parties could have agreed how to handle an event which by hypothe-
sis they neither expected nor foresaw.").
157. Farnsworth, supra note 13, at 879-81; P. ATIYAH, supra note 134, at 89.
158. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
159. See Schlegel, supra note 27, at 438-40; Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra
note 10, at 396-400; supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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codified into a rule of law, would reduce overall transaction
costs.
Proponents of adjustment have also attempted to use game
theory to demonstrate that nonopportunistic parties in a rela-
tional contract would have agreed to adjust their bargain had
they considered the disruptive event that subsequently materi-
alized, and that the law therefore ought to impose the same re-
sult on the parties to prevent opportunism. Using this logic,
Professor Jeffery Harrison contends that parties ignorant of
legal allocations and incapable of taking advantage of each
other would adopt a maximin strategy of cooperation at the ne-
gotiation stage to resolve disputes that subsequently arise.160
Harrison's model further assumes that each party believes it
stands an equal chance of suffering harm from a disruptive, un-
certain event, so that in the absence of a loss-sharing rule, each
party believes it bears an equal chance of suffering the entire
loss or none of it. The expected value to each party of an unal-
located disruptive event, therefore, equals one-half its actual
value, discounted by the probability of occurrence. If the par-
ties agree beforehand to share the loss, they will also face an
expected value of one-half the actual value of the loss, dis-
counted by the probability of occurrence. Each party will
choose the latter course, Harrison argues, because it will adopt
a maximin strategy of cooperation, even though there is a situa-
tion in which it would do better-the situation in which there is
no sharing of risk and the event would impose a loss only on
the other party.
Despite some difficulties with his model,161 Harrison's con-
clusion that parties may choose a maximin strategy of sharing
losses seems credible. If the actors are even slightly risk
averse, they will be willing to surrender part of the potential
benefit in order to avoid part of the potential loss if they con-
sider themselves as likely as their trading partners to require
assistance as a result of an intervening event.16 2 Thus, the ar-
160. Harrison, supa note 115, at 595-601.
161. For instance, Harrison assumes that an event would generate a loss of
equal value to each party to the contract, so that the expected loss of the event
would likewise be the same to each party. His question then becomes how to
allocate that loss once it has occurred. In fact, an event could generate losses
of varying amounts to the parties, and the resulting difference in expected
losses in the absence of a sharing rule could affect the parties' willingness to
share. See id- at 596-99.
162. In addition, there is some support for the proposition that maximin
strategies are most likely to be adopted in two-party bargaining situations
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gument goes, because most parties would have agreed to ex
ante loss sharing, the law may properly impose ex post
adjustment.
There are two problems with converting these particular
decision-making principles into a legal rule. First, as suggested
above, rational actors facing uncertainty may select among a va-
riety of decision strategies and are not driven inexorably to a
maximin solution or to a particular maximin solution. Alterna-
tive strategies may evidence an unwillingness to share losses, or
at least an unwillingness to be obligated to do so. Should this
result obtain in more than idiosyncratic cases, neither the
moral nor the efficiency justification for loss sharing based on
the silent intention of the parties may prevail. Second, Harri-
son's invocation of a Rawlsian veil163 behind which actors are
assumed to scrutinize possible future states ignores the possibil-
ity that commercial bargainers may have legitimately obtained
information that allows for rational allocation of risk without
loss sharing. If each actor, based on subjective beliefs achieved
after making judgments permitted by bounded rationality, be-
lieves itself to be in a superior position to control subsequent
uncertainty, then neither will desire a loss-sharing strategy. In-
stead, each party will desire the transactional structure that al-
lows the one who guesses correctly about the future to obtain
the gains of uncertainty. The models on which Harrison draws
to assume risk aversion involve actors who cannot coordinate or
communicate with one another, so that bargaining to a mutu-
ally satisfactory solution to uncertainty is impossible.164 For
this reason, the parties are driven to maximin positions. The
contractual context of a long-term supply contract, however,
obviously contains no such constraint, and no "veil of igno-
rance" is required to obtain the benefits of cooperation when
the parties can communicate and coordinate with one another.
The fact that contracting parties subsequently regret the bar-
gains they made does not require invocation of a model that as-
sumes the absence of any bargain at all.165
where the consequences of any strategy are relatively easy to calculate. See R.
WOLFF, supra note 151, at 55.
163. Harrison, supra note 115, at 596 n.127.
164. Harrison seems to approach the problem as a Prisoners' Dilemma, in
which the players are prevented from communicating with one another. See
R. JEFFREY, supra note 15, at 15-18; R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 33, at 94-
97.
165. It should be remembered that Rawls selects a pessimistic maximin po-
sition because the parties behind the veil have a high level of ignorance about
matters that would otherwise be material to their choices. "The essential
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5. Contract as Individual Expression
The idea that rational actors would be willing, in some situ-
ations, to accept the consequences of uncertainty even though
those consequences and the resulting expected losses could be
reduced through ex post adjustment reflects a basic distinction
between the theoretical underpinnings of a paternalistic rela-
tional contract theory and a theory of contract as a mechanism
for autonomous individual expression. 66 As is evident from
the jargon of fiduciary responsibility that accompanies the rela-
tional model,167 parties to the relationship owe obligations to
one another exceeding those derived directly from contractual
terms. If this jargon is accepted as accurately depicting the ele-
ments of the relationship, relationalism must be recognized as a
transformation of classical contract to the more nebulous realm
of fiduciary relations.68 The distinction between the two is re-
inforced by Professor Arthur Jacobson's forceful argument that
contract is an expression of individual sovereignty and private
ordering that is the very antithesis of the fiduciary nature of
"relational contracts."169 To move from a contractual regime to
one that treats a party as a trustee for its trading partner,
point though is that in justice as fairness the parties do not know their concep-
tion of the good and cannot estimate their utility in the ordinary sense." J.
RAwis, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 155 (1971). Commercial parties in a capitalist
system who presumably seek to maximize profit or some other measure of
utility do not suffer from these disabilities. Of course, failure to impose shar-
ing may be argued to be a characteristic of the existing commercial system
that indicates a need for total overhaul. If that is the argument, however, the
rules governing commercial impracticability are the least of the proponent's
problems.
166. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE Li rrs OF JUSTICE 105-13 (1982)
("From the standpoint of autonomy, a contract's moral force derives from the
fact of its voluntary agreement; when I enter freely into an argument, I am
bound by its terms, whatever they may be.").
167. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
168. As one commentator has recently distinguished the two categories:
No party to a contract has a general obligation to take care of the
other, and neither has the right to be taken care of....
In contrast to contract... relations, in which both parties seek
to satisfy their own needs and desires through the relation, fiduciary
relations are designed not to satisfy both parties' needs, but only those
of the entrustor.
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800-01 (1983). Professor Tamar
Frankel perceives an expansion of relations that fall within the fiduciary cate-
gory. The obligation of adjustment to satisfy a trading partner would seem to
confirm her perception.
169. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and As.
sociations in the Common Law, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 599, 615-29 (1980).
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therefore, is to restructure the contractual understanding and
to replace the individual expression inherent in negotiated con-
tract with a regime that invites judicial intervention to restruc-
ture the bargain in the name of saving the parties from their
own ignorance.
Once the use of contract as a means of individual expres-
sion is recognized, the implications of imposing the relational
model become more clear. Assume, for instance, that the quite
reasonable motivation for the long-term contract between
Printer and Supplier was to gamble about subsequent prices of
paper. Printer might have guessed that prices were about to in-
crease, so that locking itself into a long-term contract price that
would subsequently be less than spot market prices would be to
its advantage. That same advantage, however, would necessar-
ily be to Supplier's detriment. Supplier may have guessed just
the opposite. If the transaction was a gamble, an obligation to
adjust when the risk that was the subject of the gamble materi-
alizes frustrates the very reason for the transaction.170
The parties need not begin from diametrically opposed as-
sumptions-and the contract need not be zero-sum-in order to
view the agreement as a rational outcome of individual expres-
sion. For example, the parties may roughly agree on the
probability of an intervening event, or on the decisional criteria
by which to determine the probability of the event, but differ
significantly in their reactions to that information. They may
have different levels of risk aversion or of confidence171 in a
170. Professor Oliver Williamson has recently investigated the impractica-
bility doctrine from a transaction-cost perspective. He has identified three po-
tential disabilities of a regime that strictly enforces bargains: gambling
incentives, information disparities, and unintended cost escalation. Professor
Williamson questions whether the game of commerce should be available for
gambling, since players may be using other parties' resources. The argument
above suggests that gambling may advance individual expression and social
welfare, subject to the discussion below concerning third party effects. See in-
fra notes 207-15 and accompanying text. Professor Williamson's concern for
information disparities centers on the possibility that commercially able but
contractually unsophisticated firms may face disincentives if confronted with
strict enforcement. Although able firms may suffer information disparities,
avenues of compensation other than adjustment do exist. For instance, such
firms could and should seek legal advisors who represent more established
firms and who are aware of contractual practices that reflect the knowledge of
those firms. Williamson himself is somewhat skeptical of the ability of adjust-
ment to reduce contracting costs related to avoidance of unintended cost esca-
lation. See Williamson, Assessing Contract (forthcoming) (copy on file with
the author).
171. For example, a party may lack confidence due to a belief that insuffi-
cient information exists to choose among several reasonable outcomes of a
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particular assignment of probabilities.72 A commercial actor
who displays a high level of risk aversion or lacks confidence in
any definite assignment of probabilities may well bargain for
some loss-sharing arrangement or other relationship that cre-
ates fiduciary responsibilities. Its trading partner, however,
may feel more comfortable with the same assignment of
probabilities, and thus be willing to structure the transaction in
a manner that eschews any obligation to behave in an altruistic
manner. Presumably, if these parties were to bargain with
each other at all, they would do so in a manner that accommo-
dates their different positions. Once they reach an accommoda-
tion, it seems inappropriate to impose on them a structure for
dealing with uncertainty different from the one to which they
agreed. The deliberative process that gives an actor confidence
or doubt about the future, the possibility of bargaining for some
advantage, and the option of making educated guesses or taking
uninformed but voluntary long shots seems to underlie not
only the pursual of self-interest fostered by the commercial sys-
tem 73 but also the use of contract as a medium for defining the
scope of voluntary relationships rather than having them de-
fined by state-imposed risk-allocation devices. An agreement
that reflects that process defines in large part the parties' very
reasons for entering a commercial transaction, and imposing on
the parties a different allocation defeats those reasons and cor-
respondingly limits the autonomy of commercial actors to
strike their own bargains. This is not to say that commercial
parties would never share losses. Several of the strategies men-
tioned above implicitly require some sacrifice of independence
to avoid the risk of bearing the entire loss. That, however, may
be all that parties "behind the veil" would agree on: a principle
of freedom of contract that permits commercial actors to bind
each other to a specific allocation under uncertainty, including
but not limited to one that requires adjustment.
If the law were to go further and create obligations of ad-
justment, it would, alter the concept of contract even beyond
what advocates of adjustment appear to recognize. Although
those who espouse relational contracts apply the theory primar-
ily in situations where it is necessary to rescue a trading part-
ner from financial disadvantage, the "quasi-fiduciary" and
course of action or because a variety of choices still exist after "unreasonable"
possibilities have been dismissed.
172. See Ellsberg, supra note 38, at 660-63.
173. See supm note 32 and accompanying text.
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"partnership" language implies much more. Assume the fol-
lowing facts:
Luckout purchases all his widgets from Leech at a market price,
pursuant to a ten-year requirements contract. Their contract contains
no express clause joining the corporate interests of the parties. Wid-
gets have numerous uses, though Luckout needs them only as a com-
ponent in his new Gadget. The Gadget becomes an instant success,
leaving Luckout with immense wealth. Leech cannot raise his price
for widgets, because the alternative uses for them (other than in
Luckout's Gadgets) are less profitable and users would be unwilling to
pay more than current prices for them. Leech makes a claim for a
share of Luckout's profits on the theory that they represent assets of
the "partnership" created by the long-term arrangement.
As one commentator states, "the sharing of profits and
losses is fundamental to the notion of partnership."174 Yet it
would seem odd to honor Leech's claim in light of the separate
identities of the actors and the limited scope of their contrac-
tual arrangement. Nonetheless, the application of partnership
or fiduciary principles, expressly invoked by those who endorse
a "relational" construct for long-term transactions, suggests
just that. If Leech would be required to adjust should a disrup-
tive event render the contract disadvantageous to Luckout,
those principles would seem to create a parallel claim in favor
of Leech when Luckout achieves unanticipated success, even
though the intervening event causes no direct harm to
Leech.175
An alternative but related theory of why the law should
not presume that parties silent on the issue desire adjustment
emerges from Frank Knight's theory of profit among entrepre-
neurs.176 For Knight, uncertainty inheres in the definition of
profit, which is earned by those who exercise the best judgment
over a range of business decisions. Each decision is made in the
face of various uncertainties; actors that have or fear lower
rates of success may confront uncertainty through some kind of
relational mechanism, whereas those who have the ability and
confidence to capitalize on higher rates of success reap larger
174. Harrison, supra note 115, at 592; see id. at 594 ("Partnership law and
contract law are both designed to foster the sharing of a jointly created sur-
plus.") For a case involving one commercial actor's assertion that another ac-
tor could not discontinue a line of its business because a discontinuance would
disrupt their relationship, see Fiber Indus. v. Salem Carpet Mills, Inc., 315
S.E.2d 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
175. Macneil has defined relational contracts in terms of sharing "benefits
and burdens" of the relation. See Macneil, Restatement, supra note 103, at 595.
176. See F. KNIGHT, supra note 36.
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rewards for their effort.177 Knight asserts that entrepreneurial
reaction to uncertainty explains, and advances, social progress;
minimizing obstacles to such risk taking, such as forced adjust-
ment of contractual terms, is in society's best interest.
The relational model, in sum, demonstrates both the desir-
ability and the possibility of cooperative efforts between com-
mercial actors. Inability to foretell the future may induce the
actors to adopt a mutually beneficial process for resolution of
any event that disrupts their initial expectations. The model
does not, however, compel the imposition of any duty to adjust
once that event has intervened. If the parties have reached an
ex ante agreement concerning the possibility that uncertainty
will affect the relationship, the allocation implicit in that agree-
ment suggests that the actor who initially suffers the loss either
bargained poorly or took a calculated risk that the cost of "in-
suring" through cooperation was too high. Neither situation
warrants imposition of ex post adjustment.
B. THE DESERT ARGUMENT
Some commentators support adjustment of the original
bargain after a disruptive event by claiming that the disadvan-
taged party does not "deserve" the loss and the party benefitted
does not "deserve" the gain.178 This view implicitly accepts a
premise challenged in the previous section, namely, that the
parties are unable to deal with the event that precipitates the
call for adjustment at the negotiation stage. Commercial actors
who, through purposive action, accept a recognized risk or ra-
tionally determine not to consider the possibility that a certain
contingency might arise would be difficult to describe as "unde-
serving" of any burden suffered when that contingency
arises.17 9 Adjustment proponents may argue, however, that the
conditions under which an actor assumes a risk may so impair
its judgment that the assumption ought not to be accorded legal
significance.So The next sections try to demonstrate that, even
given the possibility of impaired judgment, the concept of de-
177. Id at 264-90.
178. See Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra note 10, at 405-06 (nothing that
"the [undeserved] losses can be described as 'unfair' and the gains as 'un-
just' "); Schwartz, supra note 60, at 8-11.
179. Nor do they "deserve" assistance in extricating themselves from the
situation they created, although it might be generous to help them out. See J.
FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING 75 (1970).
180. This argument is put forth to suggest the propriety of cooling-off peri-
ods in Kronman, supra note 20, at 786-97.
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sert does not require creation of a legal duty to adjust long-
term contracts.
1. "Purchase and Sale" Desert
In an article published in 1976, Professor Alan Schwartz
embraced the idea of desert as a basis for excusing parties from
performance of contracts made unprofitable by inflation.181 For
Schwartz, desert takes on the aura of a purchase and sale
agreement. An "undeserved loss" is a "loss resulting from the
materializing of a risk a party was not paid to bear, or a gain a
party bought the right to enjoy but which a court prevented
him from realizing by excusing the other party."182 Similarly,
"undeserved gain" is rooted in the understood bargain of the
parties: "An 'undeserved' gain means a gain a party did not buy
the right to enjoy or a loss resulting from a risk a party was
paid to bear but which a court shifted to his contract
partner."3
Schwartz's definition appears properly to preclude some as-
signments of rights that would not commonly be spoken of as
deserved.18 4 Nevertheless, given Schwartz's stated purpose of
using "desert" to invoke "widely acceptable values,"185 his view
of the relationship between desert and bargain appears anoma-
181. Schwartz, supra note 60. Professor Schwartz ultimately rejected the
desert case for excuse for fear that uneven judicial administration of the con-
sequent rule would undermine contract stability. Id. at 11-19; see also Dawson,
Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U.L. REV.
1, 35-38 (1984) (noting that parties have same advantage of hindsight as judge
and more expertise in subject matter of contract). Nevertheless, Professor
Schwartz's initial impression of the desert case as "appealing" and his resort to
"widely acceptable values," Schwartz, supra note 60, at 8, suggests that he
would endorse excuse if the administrative difficulties could be resolved.
Although Schwartz limited his analysis to excuse, rejecting loss splitting
on the similar basis of judicial inability to accurately measure the value loss of
individual parties, see id. at 8 n.20, Professor Speidel subsequently picked up
the banner and applied Schwartz's analysis to the adjustment remedy. Spel-
del, supra note 10. For convenience, references will be only to "Schwartz's ar-
gument," although the analysis applies to both authors' arguments.
182. Schwartz, supra note 60, at 8.
183. Id.
184. For instance, the fruits of gratuitous acts, not governed by contract
and unrelated to the recipient's conduct, such as a gift from an admiring aunt
to a newborn niece, would not likely be referred to in terms of desert. In addi-
tion, the requirement that payment be made for gains received precludes de-
sert claims to resources obtained through "luck." For instance, a person who
finds a twenty-dollar bill on the sidewalk would not be said to "deserve" the
money.
185. See Schwartz, supra note 60, at 8.
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lous in excluding cases where one party produces a benefit for
which no one has been paid but where a desert claim to the
benefit appears appropriate. To see why this is so, consider one
of Schwartz's examples:
The seller, S, is a dealer [in corn, which he must purchase shortly
before delivery to his buyer]; the buyer, B, [is] a wholesaler. The con-
tract price is $1.20 per bushel. When the contract is made, the price to
dealers like S-the price at elevators-is $1.00 a bushel; the price to
retailers-the price at which B expects to resell-is $L50. The parties
assume that corn selling at $1.00 may fluctuate through a range
bounded by $.82 on the low side and $1.18 on the high side (i.e.,
±$.18). They know the risk of these fluctuations is fully reflected in
the current prices dealers charge. This knowledge necessarily implies
an expectation by B that S will deliver for $1.20 if the price at eleva-
tors goes to $1.18, although if S breached he could resell at $1.38. An
unanticipated 50 percent inflation occurs, raising the price at elevators
to $1.50; from dealers like S to buyers like B to $1.80; and from whole-
salers like B to retailers to $2.25. S breaches, buys the corn at $L50,
and resells to another at $1.80; B covers at $1.80 and resells at
$2.25.186
Schwartz concludes that if S were to be excused from per-
formance, he would be able to avoid a risk, a rise to $1.38, that
he was compensated to take. His saving, therefore, includes an
"undeserved gain." Similarly, B would have lost part of the
gain that he had purchased the right to enjoy, an "undeserved
loss." Since excuse produces undeserved losses and gains, allo-
cation of loss by desert might seem to require that S's obliga-
tion be enforced. If the contract were enforced, however, B will
receive an "undeserved gain;" he will be able to purchase corn
at the old contract price and sell at the new market price, yield-
ing him a profit greater than the one he purchased the right to
enjoy in his contract with S. Schwartz implicitly recognizes this
state of affairs, for he states that enforcement would create un-
deserved gains and losses that would exceed undeserved gains
and losses produced by excuse. On the basis of that compari-
son, Schwartz concludes that excuse would provide a superior
outcome in this situation.1 8 7
Schwartz may be right that in some cases excuse will mini-
mize societal dislocations due to unanticipated events, but this
is no desert argument. A desert argument would excuse or not
excuse S because he would receive what he deserves under one
outcome and would not receive what he deserves under the
other. Schwartz argues instead that both excuse and enforce-
186. Id at 9.
187. See 'id at 10.
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ment produce undeserved gains and losses but that one should
be favored over the other because its result minimizes the un-
deserved gains or losses. At bottom, therefore, Schwartz's argu-
ment is an argument that identifies desert with cost
minimization.188 To say that the loss in these cases ought to be
allocated in a manner that reduces societal cost is perfectly ac-
ceptable.189 Such an argument is consistent with both a utilita-
rian allocation of entitlements and an allocation that seeks to
minimize the number of morally bad outcomes in the world.190
Nevertheless, couching that result, rooted as it is in public in-
terest, in terms of what the parties "deserve" becomes both un-
necessary and misleading.
Schwartz's confusion of desert as a principle of bargaining
with desert as a principle of ethics makes his definition depart
from his self-proclaimed standard of "widely acceptable val-
ues." Desert as a principle of bargaining excludes cases in
which gains from trade would generally be considered to be de-
served even though the other party received no commensurate
payment. Assume, for instance, the following:
Omniscient, through diligent, painstaking, and expensive research, de-
termines that a volcanic eruption in the Pacific Northwest will soon
occur and destroy sufficient timber in the area to increase appreciably
the price of lumber. He therefore enters into a requirements contract
with Dunce whereby the latter, who suspects nothing of the impend-
ing eruption, agrees to supply all of Omniscient's lumber require-
ments over the next five years at today's prices plus an annual
increase calculated on the basis of the historical rate of inflation in
lumber prices over the previous five years. The historical rate does
not reflect price fluctuations that are due to large decreases in the
supply of timber. The eruption occurs and Omniscient's price predic-
tions prove accurate. 1 9 1
Applying Schwartz's rubic, Omniscient's gain appears unde-
served. Omniscient certainly did not "buy the right to enjoy
that gain" in the usual sense because he gave Dunce nothing in
return. Omniscient could argue that he bought the right to the
gain in the sense of having forgone opportunities to engage in
188. Cf Daniels, Merit and Meritocracy, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 206, 210
(1978) (relating notions of merit and desert to goal of maximum productivity).
Although it might be possible to construct an argument that cost minimization
equals desert, Schwartz's appeal to "widely acceptable values" seems to pre-
clude such a strained definition.
189. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 63, at 90.
190. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 179, at 81. (arguing that "the seller de-
serves to be excused because doing so is consistent with the public interest").
191. This hypothetical is a modified version of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 161, illustration 10 (1979); see also Kronman, Contract Law and
Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 489-91 (1980).
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other profitable activities to pursue his research into volcanic
activity. 92 Schwartz's symmetrical treatment of undeserved
gain and undeserved loss, however, implies that payment to the
gainer should exactly offset payment to the loser, that is, that
payments be direct transfers between the parties. Thus, even if
Omniscient did pay for his gain in the broader sense, Dunce's
loss is surely "undeserved" in that it resulted from the "materi-
alization of a risk [he] was not paid to bear." Using Schwartz's
analysis, Dunce sold at a price that reflected a willingness to
bear "standard price-affecting risks,"193 which might cause
price fluctuations within an acceptable range, but which did not
reflect any expectation, and hence any willingness, to bear the
risk of a significant escalation of the value of the lumber.194
2. "Individual Efforts" Desert
The conclusion that Omniscient does not deserve his gain
seems anomalous in light of the "widely acceptable values" to
which Schwartz appeals. Other, more widely shared concep-
tions of desert would readily reward Omniscient's conduct.
Professor Feinberg's acclaimed analysis contends that desert
claims differ from claims of entitlement, eligibility, or qualifica-
tion in that one deserves a resource "in virtue of some pos-
sessed characteristic or prior activity" that relates to the
claimant.195 Desert claims are not predicated simply on satis-
faction of conditions laid down by rules or minimal qualifica-
tions, nor do they derive from the consequences generated by
the activity, such as the promotion of general welfare. Instead,
the bases of desert are features about the claimant as an indi-
vidual that are tied to the resources claimed.196
192. Omniscient's investment of personal resources to determine the likeli-
hood of eruption may be more concrete evidence of a "purchase."
193. See Schwartz, supra note 60, at 9.
194. Professor Schwartz's article anticipated the case of Omniscient and
Dunce by suggesting that "the desert case would be nondirective" where the
parties' expectations about the future are "asymmetric." See id. at 13 n.30. If
desert is predicated on individual effort, however, then desert arguments
would be expected to arise only where one party obtained information that
gave rise to an idiosyncratic and thus asymmetric expectation about the future.
Schwartz's exception thus appears to swallow the rule. If, on the other hand,
the parties' expectations are symmetric, the most that can be said is that, as
Schwartz says, a court will have an easier time determining whether an actual
price fluctuation deviated from the parties' expectations sufficiently to permit
excuse. This argument for administrative convenience, however, seems to
have little to do with notions of desert.
195. J. FEINBERG, supra note 179, at 58-59 (emphasis in original).
196. So defined, the theory of desert reflects Professor Robert Nozick's un-
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Thus understood, Omniscient appears to deserve his gain
from the contract. He has not simply jumped through the le-
galistic hoops of offer and acceptance that entitle him to en-
force his contract, nor has he "lucked into" a good deal. He has
not actively deceived, misled,197 or coerced Dunce into the
transaction nor, presumably, taken undue advantage of Dunce's
need to sell before Dunce had an opportunity to obtain equal
information.198 Omniscient has instead exploited his own abili-
ties to engage in research, made educated guesses, and negoti-
ated effectively. This is not to say that Dunce deserves his loss.
Unlike Schwartz's conception of desert, Feinberg's does not re-
quire that a deserved gain of one party offset a deserved loss of
another.199
Schwartz and Feinberg would agree that neither the gainer
nor the loser following a truly "unforeseen" event deserves its
position.200 To the extent that advocates of adjustment believe
that ultimate distribution of resources depends on desert,201
however, neither Schwartz nor Feinberg could maintain that
the party adversely affected deserves adjustment.202 Absent the
derstanding that one deserves the products produced by the use of one's assets
that have not been illegitimately obtained, see R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA 224-26 (1974), Professor J.R. Lucas's statement that what one de-
serves depends on one's deeds, see J. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 164-65, 197, 200
(1980), and Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb's recent formulation that desert expla-
nations refer to some anterior event for which the deserving person is respon-
sible, see Weinreb, The Complete Idea of Justice, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 752, 765
(1984).
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979).
198. See Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 741, 763-73 (1982).
199. Feinberg describes such desert claims as "nonpolar." J. FEINBERG,
supra note 179, at 62.
200. If the event is truly unforeseen, the actors who confront gain or loss
precipitated by the event cannot, in Feinberg's terms, be said to deserve their
changes in position because the actors did nothing to cause the event. See
supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Schwartz's terms, the
actors have not "bought the rights" to the gain or loss. See supra notes 181-83
and accompanying text.
201. This is certainly not Feinberg's position, as he concludes that his expo-
sition "should be sufficient to lay to rest the philosophical myths that desert is
a single factor to be weighed against other ... considerations in ethical deci-
sionmaking and that it represents uniquely the claim of justice." J. FEINBERG,
supra note 179, at 79. Lucas reaches the same conclusion. See J. Lucas, supra
note 196, at 207. Professor John Rawls wholly rejects the use of desert as a
distributive principle. See J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 313 (1971). Others
do not wholly reject desert but recognize that desert claims are subordinate to
other claims. See T. NAGEL, The Policy of Preference, in MORTAL QUESTIONS
97 (1979).
202. This is a different claim than one that asserts that the party who gains
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requisite payment, adjustment would constitute undeserved
gain for the disadvantaged party under Schwartz's model. Us-
ing Feinberg's analysis, the same assumption of ignorance that
triggers the aggrieved party's claim for adjustment undermines
its claim to deserve adjustment. If the party's position is "fortu-
itous," its claim has nothing to do with its abilities or prior per-
formance, so no desert basis for its adjustment claim exists.20 3
Gains and losses in this situation may be undeserved, but so is
any adjustment remedy.204
If the assumption of unforeseeability is relaxed and the
analysis returns to the decision-making model of bounded ra-
tionality, the concept of desert predicated on individual effort
seems to support the nonadjustment model.205 The bounded-
rationality model assumes actors engage in a rational decision-
making process that satisfies their concerns for subsequent in-
tervening events, despite their inability to make precise proba-
bilistic calculations. Thus, an actor who has rationally
determined to exclude a specific risk, or not to consider further
the possibility of an intervening event, is not simply an inno-
cent victim of circumstances. On the contrary, such an actor
has acted with as much foresight as it desires and has adapted
to uncertainty by applying appropriate principles of decision-
making. An actor that has reasoned that additional invest-
ments in discovery and consideration of risks are not worth the
effort seems to deserve the consequences of that decision. If,
after rational calculations, that actor determines not to further
consider potential adverse effects of the contract or not to
strike a bargain that maximizes its position should such an
event occur, it has little basis for complaint about the bargain
when those effects appear. The other party may or may not
"deserve" the gain of receiving performance under the original
from the event deserves to compensate the loser. Feinberg indicates that this
latter claim does not necessarily follow from a desert claim to compensation:
"Compensation for harm which is no assignable person's fault is, however, a
different matter [from desert of reparation for wrongful injury]. The unem-
ployed may deserve compensation for their loss, but it is not necessarily true
that there is someone who deserves to be held liable for it." See J. FENBERG.
supra note 179, at 75.
203. See Speidel, Supply Contracts, supra note 10, at 406 n.163.
204. The disadvantaged party may predicate its demand on some other
norm, such as societal benefit. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text
The point here is simply that the disadvantaged party cannot claim it deserves
adjustment.
205. Absent the requisite payment to the other party, Schwartz would
probably still denominate any gain following an intervening event as "unde-
served." See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
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contract terms.20 6 Nothing the gaining party has done, how-
ever, suggests that it deserves to be required to compensate the
disadvantaged party. The disadvantaged party's "deserved" loss
is enough to preclude any desert claim it has to sharing the
loss. Indeed, if the advantaged party chose a particular transac-
tional structure in order to be in a superior position should
such an event intervene, any gain it achieves seems deserved.
The individual efforts desert argument, therefore, militates
against adjustment far more than it shares the paternalistic
view in favor of adjustment.
III. THIRD PARTY EFFECTS AND THE DUTY TO
ADJUST
To this point, the argument against adjustment has relied
on an assumption that contracts between commercial actors
create minimal externalities.207 In some contexts, that assump-
tion must be relaxed before ultimately embracing nonadjust-
ment. In the case of a long-term supply contract, if an event
not expressly provided for in the agreement occurs that renders
the contract far less beneficial than anticipated for one of the
parties, requiring performance may impose significant costs on
nonparties. Performance of the contract might render perform-
ance of other contracts by the disadvantaged party with exter-
nal parties significantly more costly or might be so financially
destructive to the disadvantaged party that its employees, credi-
tors, or those who otherwise depend on its economic vitality
(for example, suppliers or other businesses in a "one-company"
town that revolves around the disadvantaged party) also suffer.
What ought to be done?
Broadly defined, third parties include anyone not a signa-
tory to the contract at issue. Not all such third parties, how-
ever, should be considered equal for purposes of determining
whether a disruptive event justifies adjustment. The extent to
which the bargaining model developed above applies to nonpar-
ties may vary with their relationship with the disadvantaged
party or with their ability to protect themselves from the inter-
vening event. For example, if a fuel supplier has a contract to
sell fuel at a constant price when energy costs are increasing
rapidly, enforcement of the contract will leave the fuel supplier
less able to pay debt service on loans and wages to employees.
206. If the intervening act did not threaten to disadvantage the other party,
the party may not have considered the risk at all.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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From the perspective of the fuel supply contract that caused
the difficulty, both the supplier's commercial creditors and its
employees are third parties. Both creditors and employees,
moreover, may have anticipated a long-term relationship with
the disadvantaged party when their relationships began. Thus,
the relationships between these third parties and the disadvan-
taged party exhibit some of the same characteristics as the rela-
tionship between the disadvantaged fuel supplier and the
advantaged party. Enforcement of the fuel supply contract
might therefore simply be viewed as an event disruptive to the
disadvantaged supplier's contracts with its creditors and em-
ployees. Where the loss should fall in these circumstances
could then be determined by reference to the same analysis of
risk allocation under uncertainty that was applied to enforce
the fuel contract.
There may, however, be reasons to treat the creditors and
the employees differently. If employees bargain with the disad-
vantaged party individually rather than through a collective
body, they may be so susceptible to heuristic errors in deciding
terms of employment and have so little access to risk informa-
tion that can be efficiently gathered and analyzed that they are
more analogous to the discrete than the relational paradigm.208
Further, in non-collective-bargaining contexts, the employee
may have insufficient bargaining power to structure the rela-
tionship in a manner to provide for risk sharing. Thus, employ-
ees may not exercise sufficient commercial rationality to place
on them unhesitatingly any loss that accrues by operation of
the bargain. Moreover, employees may not readily perceive
employment decisions as risk-taking enterprises. On the con-
trary, acceptance of employment can be construed as a risk-
reducing mechanism by which employees place their labor in
the hands of those who they consider better able than them-
selves to deal with the uncertainties of the future.209 Conse-
quently, applying the risk allocation under uncertainty analysis
developed above to an individual employment contract may be
inappropriate.
The commercial creditor, on the other hand, is largely in
the business of taking risks. It extended or could have ex-
tended credit on terms that reflected a degree of risk arrived at
208. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16; supra notes 168-69 and ac-
companying text.
209. See F. KNIGHT, supra note 36, at 264-312; A. POUNSKY, AN INTRODUC.
TION TO LAW AND ECONoMIcs 52-53 (1983).
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after deliberation of information considered relevant and worth
obtaining.210 The creditor's conscious risk taking and the avail-
ability of devices to minimize risks, such as monitoring the cash
flow and requiring approval of long-term contracts of the
debtor, parallel the capacities of the immediate parties to the
contract; the argument against adjustment, therefore, appears
to apply equally to the commercial creditor and to the parties.
Even the protection of the most sympathetic third parties
affected by enforcement of the contract, those that exercised
little or no control over the consequences of the event that gen-
erated the claim for excuse,211 would not necessarily justify ju-
dicial intervention to adjust contractual obligations. If the
advantaged party has rationally bargained to be in a position to
profit, or at least not to lose, when disruptive events material-
ize, why that party must surrender its advantage is unclear. A
utilitarian calculus might suggest that intervention is appropri-
ate because it permits third parties to gain more than the ad-
vantaged party loses. Even accepting a utilitarian norm,
however, judicial intervention would be appropriate only if no
other form of compensation to disdvantaged parties generates
greater net benefits. Some commentators have argued that en-
forcement of a duty to adjust when net benefits between the
immediate parties to the contract would be produced would
present issues of measurement not readily susceptible to judi-
cial resolution.212 These difficulties increase geometrically if a
court is attempting not only to revise a contract between the
parties but also to structure the transaction in a manner that
considers the needs of nonparties who are probably not before
the court.213
Even if these administrative difficulties could be overcome,
a utilitarian calculus would require comparison between judi-
cial adjustment and other means of assisting third parties.
Some of these alternatives could leave the advantages of the
contract intact while requiring a broader base of persons to
210. See A. SCHWARTZ & R. Scorr, supra note 20, at 514-25 (discussing se-
cured financing and various factors lenders consider when making short-term
loans).
211. Obvious examples are family members related to an employee laid off
as a result of contract enforcement. See Farber, supra note 95, at 337.
212. See Dawson, supra note 181, at 35-38; Schwartz, supra note 60, at 6-8.
213. Cf. Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Cri-
tique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 398-400 (1981) (criticising the "liberal" law-and-ec-
onomics approach to contracts on the ground that, when third-party effects are
considered, any result can be justifed).
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compensate for harm caused by the disruptive event. Such al-
ternatives might include welfare payments to compensate for
the adverse effects of nonadjustment or public taking, with
compensation, of the contract rights of the advantaged party.21 4
None of this means that externalities are irrelevant to the
desirability of adjustment. There may be cases in which disrup-
tive events have consequences of such magnitude that some sac-
rifice of individual benefit is warranted. The inflation in post-
World War I Germany is the textbook example.215 Short of
such extreme situations, however, courts seem poorly suited to
balance an advantaged party's benefits from enforcement
against nonparties' costs and even less well suited to determine
the best mechanism for resolving the consequences of an event
with broad societal effects.
IV. CONCLUSION
When entering a long-term contract, commercial actors
make several decisions about the future. Subsequent events
will frequently lead them to regret their choices. The manner
in which we frame the law to respond to this issue says a great
deal about our view of contract and rationality. The more we
view contract as a communitarian exercise, and the less we
credit individuals with the capacity to consider and deal with
the future, the more we are willing paternalistically to just re-
lationships following a postcontract event. This Article adopts
a different approach. The ability of commercial actors to de-
velop strategies for dealing with uncertainty, strategies that
permit but do not require sharing, suggests a more individualis-
tic view of contract and a broader view of what constitutes ra-
tional commercial behavior. My belief that moral notions such
as desert do not justify an obligation to adjust also leads me to
conclude that we must respect bargains struck through individ-
ual negotiation. The issue is not whether individuals will suffer
harsh results from such a legal rule; on occasion, they will. The
issue is whether we can do better by acting through the law
rather than through a sense of moral obligation by those who
act within the structure created by the legal rules. For the rea-
sons discussed, I conclude that we cannot.
214. The Supreme Court endorsed takings of contract rights to serve public
purposes in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977).
215. See Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63
B.U.L. REV. 1039 (1983); Dawson, The Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts:
Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171 (1935).
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